Passing Bull 386 – David Hume on bigots

Whatever you say about some wars, you are likely to get your head shot off.  So I content myself with the timeless truths of a Scots philosopher who was well used to people trying to put him away in the name of God.

The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state which to them is so uneasy; and they think that they can never remove themselves far enough from it by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief.

But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: And if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by shewing them that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner….

Disputes with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles are, of all others, the most irksome; except perhaps those with persons entirely disingenuous who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controversy from affectation, from a spirit of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity superior to the rest of mankind.  The same blind adherence to their arguments is expected in both; and the same passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood.  And as reason is not the source whence either disputant derives his tenets, it is in vain to expect that any logic which speaks not to the affectations will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.

Did you mark the reference to the ‘disingenuous who really do not believe the opinions they defend but engage in the controversy from a spirit of opposition?’  Hume would have spotted Bolt a mile off.

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