The haughty arrogance of lawyers Part II How the Essendon players were dudded

 

Apology

I am very sorry that this note is so long, more than 16,000 words or forty pages, but this is a very big mess.  I am not so much concerned with what the players did, as with what others have done to them.  For the most part, I deal with the process rather than the issues themselves.  I have tried to avoid or to explain legal terms.  I have referred to one reported case and to the writings of two jurists (that are part of my legal fabric). I would ask people, and especially lawyers, to think about the issues.  After looking hard at this case over some days, I have come to a clear and settled view, grounded in long experience, that something very bad has happened here, and that the players have been very badly wronged.

Ray Groom is lawyer who was a first class AFL player.  He is a member of the tribunal that hears appeals from the relevant anti-doping body.  He was Premier of Tasmania.  He is uniquely placed to assess these issues.  I have seen a memorandum from him expressing similar views on some of these points but in shorter, simpler, and more magisterial terms.

Nevertheless, I commend my own note to your earnest attention.

1 The law (the Code) is bad – innocent but guilty

Under our law, you do not commit a crime simply by performing some act.  If my fist connects with your head, I have not committed the crime of assault if it happened by accident.  The law requires a guilty mind before my act makes me liable to be found guilty of and punished for committing a crime.  It would be monstrous if my accidental punching of someone led to their death and I was found guilty of murder.

That is the general position at our common law.  You can get an argument about whether that was the case a thousand years ago, but our parliaments have created more and more exceptions in areas like workplace safety or environmental protection.  For policy reasons that seemed to be good at the time, these offences, which are called offences of strict liability, can lead to your being found liable just for your action or inaction – and regardless of your state of mind.  You can therefore be found guilty of committing a crime without having a guilty mind.  You can, if you like, be an innocent criminal, because you can be found to be guilty of a crime even though your mind was innocent.

Such a result is not just anomalous – it is very dangerous and potentially very wounding.  It is one thing to allow guilty innocence or innocent guilt in some welfare or environmental cases where ordinarily the targets are large, wealthy, and inviting corporations.  It is altogether a different thing to do this where the reputation and livelihood of the working man are on the line.  Such a course of law is very wrong.

Thirty-four players of the Essendon football club are being called cheats.  They are being called cheats on a finding made under a law that does not require proof of dishonesty or any other form of criminal intent.  This is the fatal vice of the law of this Code.  People who ask why the players insist on proclaiming their innocence simply do not understand that no one has ever made a finding of dishonesty against them.  They have been left by their betters on a conveyor belt that will lead to their unjustified harm unless they can find a way to get off it.

The Panel said there are two kinds of anti-doping rule violations.  One is the presence of a prohibited substance in an athlete’s sample.  That was not alleged here.  The other is the strict liability model.  That was invoked here, and it specifically says that the prosecution does not have to prove intent or fault.

It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters his or her body.  Accordingly, it is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping rule violation for Use of  a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method……The success or failure of the Use or attempted Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method is not material.  It is sufficient that the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method was Used or Attempted to be Used for an anti-doping violation to be committed.

So, here we have a rule or a law that specifically rules out what has been the basic principle of our relevant common law for a millennium.  There does not have to be a guilty mind.  The mind might be innocent or just blank.  The law then goes on to say that it does not matter if the criminal derived no benefit from the breach.  (You might imagine a stern ruler or a totalitarian state saying that that is the law on the question of guilt or innocence; you would know that you are in cloud cuckoo land if it has no effect on the penalty.  Yet that, we are told, is the case here.)

Since this innocent but guilty law is at the heart of this controversy, let me set out at some length some observations made by the great American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes in the first chapter his work The Common Law.

It is commonly known that the early forms of legal procedure were grounded in vengeance… Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done.  It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked…..

My aim and purpose have been to show that the various forms of liability known to modern law spring from the common ground of revenge.  In the sphere of contract the fact will hardly be material outside the cases which have been stated in this Lecture.  But in the criminal law and the law of torts [civil wrongs] it is of the first importance.  It shows that they have started from a moral basis, from the thought that someone was to blame.

Thus the punishment must be equal, in the sense of proportion to the crime, because its only function is to destroy it.  Others, without this logical apparatus, are content to rely upon a felt necessity that suffering should follow wrong-doing…..

The degree of civilisation which a people has reached, no doubt, is marked by their anxiety to do as they would be done by.…

It is not intended to deny that criminal liability, as well as civil, is founded on blameworthiness.  Such a denial would shock the moral sense of any civilised community; or, to put it another way, a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear.

Criminal law, and a large extent the civil law, looks for someone, in the words of Justice Holmes, to blame.  Who should be blamed for what happened at Essendon?

Since this point is fundamental, and it has not been made by any press commentary that I have seen, I may repeat it.  These players are being called cheats on the basis of a finding by a tribunal that did not call for a finding of dishonesty.  In a civilised nation with rational laws that would be enough to end this discussion.

Now, I am not an expert in this part of our law.  You will see that I have a lot of trouble following it.  I infer that the scheme is that WADA (the World Anti-Doping Authority) says that you can trust us to identify those substances that we can properly impose a blanket ban on.  We will be the judge and jury on the question of what types of substance may give athletes an advantage over others such that ordinary people would consider that their conduct was dishonest – that is, they would think that an athlete using such a substance was a cheat.  And you can trust us that it is reasonable to have a blanket ban that does not require us to show an intent to cheat.  And then you can trust us to provide the means by which the proved presence of that prohibited substance can be made the basis of an offence irrespective of the intent of the player or the effect of the substance.

That is three big chunks of trust in WADA.  Are they worth it?  I will come back to that.  But, at least as presently advised, two things look clear to me about the proceedings before the Panel.  First, there was no allegation, and therefore no finding, that the players intended to breach the rules or gain any unfair advantage.  Secondly, there was no allegation, and therefore no finding, that any player did obtain an unfair advantage.

If I am right about that, and this point is fundamental, the Panel finding, even if it were admissible in court, does not in my view warrant a finding that any player cheated.  But those propositions do lead to the conclusion that this whole process and its results have been manifestly unjust to the players.

You can see why regulators may want to impose strict liability in some areas of sports business.  We are coming to terms with the fact that betting leads to match fixing.  That has now reached Wimbledon.  The regulators might wish to make a law saying that a player is guilty no matter what his state of mind is if his phone records reveal contact with a bookie.  You are strictly liable for what happens on your phone and you cannot even talk to a bookie.  They might say that you can have red tomatoes but not green tomatoes, and that if they find green ones in you, or if it is proved that you have taken them, then you are strictly liable no matter how careful or innocent you were in your choice of food.

These are all serious policy issues in a business that is going under on dope and betting.  That leaves at least three questions.  Who decides these policy issues, and who formulates the law?  If the strict liability model is adopted, what safeguards to prevent injustice do you build in to allow for exoneration or amelioration as a defence, and also on penalty whether or not the defence is made out?  And, who decides whether the law has been infringed, and what the sanction should be?

One object of this note is to show that AFL players generally have been handed the three worst possible answers to those questions.

2 The second flaw in the Code – the grounds of exemption  

So, the first point I seek to make is that the Code is viciously bad for the players because it imposes strict liability in an area of conduct that should require a positive finding of guilt.  As a result, they are being accused of doing something wrong under a finding under a Code that does not require proof of wrongdoing.  Imagine suggesting to one of our cabinet ministers or bank directors that they could be rubbed out for a year just for doing a prohibited act even though their mind was quite innocent.  Put differently, how would you like to live in a regime where you had to prove your innocence?

The next problem follows on from that, which as we will see happens all the time.  If you are going to have blanket guilt, irrespective of individual fault, you will need to have some sensible and workable exemptions.  You see this all the time in tax laws and corporate governance and anti-trust laws.  The government stamps its foot, and makes a blanket law; that law is very unfair, until a body of jurisprudence develops around the exemptions.  Then some wealthy and cleverly advised people find ways to exploit the exemptions; the government stamps its foot again, and says that these ‘loopholes’ are being exploited and must be closed, and then sends in the steam roller to crush a couple of walnuts, and the whole cycle starts again.

The first problems with the exemptions here is that they only go to the consequences of a finding of guilt and they do not go to the finding of guilt itself.  In other words, you are stuck with being found guilty, but you can just try your luck to get a lesser penalty.  You might on a good day keep your ticket, but your record has gone for life.  Now, you might want to do this to a polluting company, or a bank laundering money for terrorists, but not for someone trying to make a living.  If you want it in political colour, you might do it to a BHP, Telstra, Mr Murdoch, or a bank, but not to a working man.

3 Fixed penalties are obviously wrong here

You might have a fixed scale of penalties for speeding offences or parking tickets, or for, say, rough or dangerous tackles in football, but not where you are cancelling someone’s meal ticket.

Fixed penalties are provided because the lawmakers do not trust their tribunals.  They fear that their chosen agents will be too soft or too dumb.  The whole function of fixed penalties is to take away any discretion or judgement from the tribunal when it comes to penalty.  You see this with some governments imposing mandatory imprisonment for third offences, and we know the trouble that this can give in administering justice among the indigenous peoples.

Because those who formed this Code did not trust the people who would sit on their tribunals to administer it, the players in this case have been exposed to the injustice of a scatter-gun, in circumstances where it is utterly inappropriate that they should be so exposed.

There is another problem with the fixed penalties.  You will recall that the Code says that for the purpose of establishing liability, it does not matter if the substance does not work or lead to an unfair advantage.  Two players at the one club take the same prohibited substance from the same crook.  They are both detected and found liable.  For one it worked like a charm and he went from zero to hero and won a Brownlow.  It did not work for the other.  He got cancer and left a widow and five children.  The same penalty?

4 The penalties are demonstrably unjust

As Justice Holmes observed ‘even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked’.  If some of the players were to be found liable under the Code, there would obviously be a huge difference in the range of personal culpability and there would therefore be a huge difference in the range of penalties to be imposed to mirror or reflect the different kinds of culpability or guilt.

A 20-year-old will be in a very different position to a 40-year-old player.  Someone who has played a few games will be in a very different position to one who has played 400 games.  Someone with scientific training or a tertiary degree will be different to someone who got thrown out of school very young, or someone who is a brick shy of a full load.  We are talking about footballers and not professional people in the usual sense of that term.

The reasoning of the Panel does not descend to the educational accomplishments and knowledge of the world of any of these young men.  But we know that some players did make enquiries and that some did not.  All presumably wondered how anything could be wrong when the whole regime was subject to scrutiny by the club doctor, and they had a written assurance from their employer that WADA was OK with it all.

So, the range of penalties should be great – from a slap to a belting.  What happens if one of the group has form?  Does his penalty get upped, or do they all just get the same whack anyway?

But, no, the Code strips the players of their right to be judged as individuals.  The word for this is barbarism.  This is one of the main reasons why the conduct of the AFL fixing its players with this denial of basic human rights will call for scrutiny by a court.  If a lawyer or agent advised a player to sign up to this Code one-on-one, they would be having a very short and very embarrassed confession session with their PI insurer.

Before the Panel, the AFL may have felt some embarrassment on this.  The AFL submitted to the Panel that if it were to uphold the appeal it should note ‘there is no suggestion that any Player intended to use a prohibited substance’ and that ‘if the Panel finds that any Player did use a prohibited substance, it was because he was the unwilling and unwitting victim of the gross negligence of others.’  They might also mentioned that there was a gross breach of trust committed against the players for which the term ‘errant fiduciaries’ would be far, far too light.

There is another equally comprehensive objection to this penalty scheme of the Code in this case.  I have a very clear view that if left at large on penalty on a finding of liability against these players, most Australian judges or magistrates, and almost certainly any Australian jury, would take the simple and obvious position that these poor bastards have already suffered enough, and that all those who had been chasing after them for so long had learned enough from their own frightful mistakes, and that it was time to stop damaging the very source of the players’ business, and let everyone get on with their lives.  That is the course which common sense and ordinary humanity and decency cries out for in this case.  It was also the course that the Australian nation, except for the paid assassins in the press, called out for.

There may, I suppose, be some argument about that, but I find it very hard to envisage a worse result for football or for professional sport in Australia than that which has been arrived at by this Panel.  The other footy codes must be doing handsprings.

5 The breach of the double jeopardy rule was unjustifiable

This objection also follows on from the last.  Because of the way that ASADA (the Australian Anti-Doping body) presented its case before the original tribunal, it lost.  As I follow it – and I may be wrong because I have not seen the original decision – ASADA had therefore proceeded in such a way that that tribunal did not have to consider the culpability of the players – with results that I will come to.

The Panel said that before it, ASADA adopted the submissions of WADA.  It changed its case by doing that.  When ASADA fought its own case it lost; when it fell in behind WADA, it won.  It changed its case in light of its failure the first time round.  It looks like ASADA was just inept.  Whatever epithet you choose to apply to the failure of ASADA, you will not find one that is complimentary – more importantly, all of these players have had to suffer because of the failings of this Australian regulator.  That proposition seems to me to be indisputable.  It must weigh heavily on the question of penalty.  It did not.  That and the issue of delay were two other issues that the players went down on.

Just as badly, because of the failure of ASADA before the original tribunal, that tribunal did not, as I follow it, have to go into the question of the culpability of individual players. If I am right about that, the new foreign tribunal was deprived of the opinion of people who had knowledge of the relevant conditions of employment and the relevant Australian law.  This is just another ugly morsel in an ugly dog’s breakfast.

People in business should not underestimate just how threatening this departure from the double jeopardy rule is.  Most people in business have had to confront brutish regulators who seem determined to pursue a course against people who regard themselves as ordinary citizens in a way that lacks any relation to common sense and decency.  If you fight them, and win, fair and square, you do not expect to have to do it again – a year or so later, against a new prosecutor, a new case, and before an imported bench that brings its own laws, and which does not have the knowledge or experience of the first tribunal.  It just stinks.

It is I suppose at least consistent that ASADA was seen positively to glow when they learned that their imported superiors had extricated them from their own squalid mess. ASADA would finish as it started – dumb and ugly.

6 The findings of the Panel on culpability do not accord with the facts of life

This flaw is obviously connected with the previous flaw, because the blundering of ASADA denied the new Panel the benefit of local knowledge on this issue.  The Panel decision is written by lawyers for lawyers.  The decision must look at best unworldly to many ordinary people, and it is I think a great shame that these lawyers did not address the people that they were putting down in terms that they could understand.

This is also just another case where the Code is a disastrous mine-field for the players.  Their name and future is on the line, but once the tribunal finds as a brute fact use of a prohibited product, the onus is on the accused to exculpate themselves.  They must suffer the prescribed penalty unless, relevantly:

If a Player….establishes an individual case that he….bears No Significant Fault or Negligence, then the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility may be reduced….

Do you see what WADA have done to our players?  The coppers do not have to show any fault, but to get fair treatment, the players, the accused, have to prove that they acted without significant fault.  Can you imagine a more vicious rule for the players?

For people reading this who are not lawyers, you should know that this kind of provision might fairly be called anathema to people who are.  It must revolt any fair minded common lawyer.  I had to deal with reverse onus laws in a tax tribunal for eighteen years.  Governments, like sports administrators, like to look after their own interests and for that purpose they are prepared to make, and commonly get away with, outrageous laws like these.  I was always very uncomfortable and from time to time I would publish my disquiet in reported decisions.  I can recall on one occasion saying that I now understood how the Stamp Act had cost George III the American colonies.  There is not one word from this Panel about the sheer rigour of this law.  They stay loyal and faithful to their Code to the bitter end.

Let us just look at two complaints of the Panel against these players.  The players made false statements and they did not make enough enquiries.  They signed forms and said things in those forms that they should not have said.

Is the Panel aware that about nine out of ten Australians sign tax returns in reliance on their advisers and that whether or not they have advisers, they will almost certainly have no understanding of most of the contents of the forms?  What point is there in my reading a form I do not understand? I have had to sign US tax forms for overseas transactions.  The forms were horrendous and utterly incomprehensible.  But my bank here just told me what boxes to tick, because otherwise they, the bank, could not handle the transaction at all, even though it may as well as been written in Mandarin.  It is my way or the highway sport – stop being a neurotic fop.

I also ticked a box that said I would tell Uncle Sam if there was any change in my material circumstances.  Now, I suppose that if the refuse hits the regenerator, I may be in a little trouble as a lawyer – but should footballers lose their livelihood because they have been loose in forms?

Our laws are notoriously difficult and the regulations and red tape are notoriously difficult and heavy.  But, it is one thing for bureaucrats to make all these laws and make life impossible for ordinary people; it is another thing for people to be penalized in their livelihood and reputation if they get their forms wrong.

Very many Australians have their own superannuation funds.  The Panel is probably not aware of this.  Most Australians who have these funds will have accountants who use software that generates a small pile of documents each year, about six months after the event, that have to be signed in about 20 different places.  Most taxpayers will just sign up – like I do – and because the revenue is involved, the relevant policing is done by the Australian Taxation Office.

If you stop to read these documents, which I would think most people would not, you might find something that might be either hilarious or embarrassing depending on your mood – you might, for example, find that one of the twenty or so documents you have signed says that you called a meeting of yourself and appointed yourself chairman of the meeting and then passed a resolution.  That of course just did not happen, and the statement is false.  On a bad day, someone might charge you with trying to obtain financial gain by deception.  That is theft, and slammer territory.

That is just one example of why these laws, and our laws at large, have to be administered by people who have common sense, knowledge of what goes on in this our world, and a full understanding of the proposition that there but for the grace of God go I.

It is a fact of life, is it not, that we are surrounded by things that we do not fully understand or cannot verify, and that we have to take on trust – like the state of our bank balance, our demerit points for driving, our superannuation entitlements, our rights at work, and so on.  It strikes me as very sad and unreal that these young men are being held accountable because they trusted their employer – and their employer disastrously betrayed that trust.

Some of the comments of the Panel are so puerile that you wonder whether they know anything about the real world at all.  Some of them look like rote particulars of negligence in a third rate running down case before the justices at Broadmeadows – ‘The Players have all received education in anti-doping’, ‘No Player appears to have made use of the WADA hotline,’ and ‘No Player appears to have conducted internet searches for Thymosin or to have made any other inquiry as to its elements or properties.’

In the name of heaven, how many people ring up the wallopers to ask them a legal question?  What kind of answer would they expect?  What if the players had the same view about WADA that most Australians do?  And what do the doctors who look after these learned lawyers say about the sense of lay people consulting the internet about drug use?  How would the AMA react to the suggestion that foreign lawyers are telling Australians how to deal with their doctors?

These errors show how wrong it is to ask outsiders to assess conduct by reference to standards that they neither know nor understand.

It may be instructive to compare the duty that the Panel imposed on these young men to make enquiries of their employer with the duty that the parliaments of this country put upon the directors of public companies like the big banks, BHP, or Telstra.  Under what is called the ‘business judgment rule’, directors are not liable for a business judgment if they make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose, if they do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment, and if they ‘inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believed to be appropriate’, and they reasonably believed that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.

These company directors are excused if they informed themselves about the subject matter of the judgment ‘to the extent they reasonably believed to be appropriate’.  That, I infer, is what the relevant players did at Essendon in this case.  If that is so, this Code and this Panel have imposed on these footballers at Essendon duties in their affairs that are more onerous than the duties imposed by our parliaments on the directors of BHP, Telstra, and the banks.  That result, if it follows, would be hilarious if it were not so tragic.

To go back to this case and what lawyers call the ‘merits’.  Is it the fact that these guys would have walked away unless these three lawyers had found these footballers told porkies to the wallopers?  And for that they lose a year’s work?  If so, the average Australian would say ‘Tell ‘im ‘e’s dreamin’.’  And none of the Panel would understand that.

Now, these are all matters of degree.  People will have different views on how far these players should have trusted their employer back in 2012 before this sordid little mess became a national cause célèbre.  I know some people who are very keen to scold the players.  That is a matter for them.  They may care to reflect on the advice that the narrator in The Great Gatsby says that he got from his father at the very start of that book.

Whenever you feel like criticising anyone, just remember that all the people in this world haven’t had the advantages that you’ve had.

You can conduct your own experiments about this.  Are those who condemn the players more likely to come from the jet set – like the CAS crowd – than those who incline to be more understanding?

7 Aren’t they guilty anyway?

This is a furphy, and a bad one.  When you look at how these young men have been worked over, this point is as important as the problem of being found guilty while you are innocent, or being innocent but guilty.

Our legal system is not concerned with absolute truth.  We leave that to God, the Fourth Estate, and to invincible gossips – and there is a lot of overlay in the three categories.  We only say that someone is guilty when that decision has been made after due process.  The need for due process is so much clearer when a finding of dishonesty is made that reflects on a person’s reputation and livelihood.  For the reasons I have endeavoured to spell out, I do not believe that due process was accorded here.

The people at the pub, or over the back fence, or vindictive journalists or regulators, can pontificate as much as they like.  Under our legal system, we are presumed to be innocent until a finding is made against us of guilt with due process of law.  Since I do not believe that has happened here, the Essendon players remain in my eyes innocent.

This proposition may conceivably be tested in court.  If, say, a newspaper alleged that these men were cheats, and the players challenged that allegation in court, the publishers would want to consult some very good lawyers and experts before determining to resist that challenge on the ground that the allegation is true, that is, on the ground that they will contend in court that the players are cheats – where the onus of proof is squarely on the publisher, and where the consequences of failing in that plea are in the Hiroshima category.

In short, the findings of the Panel on personal culpability look to me to be the soulless constructions of eminent black letter lawyers rather than the findings of sensible people of the world.  It really does look like bullshit to me.  They have failed to learn the facts of life Down Under.

8 The problem with the standard of proof

In the previous note, I referred to the difference in the standard of proof in civil cases (the balance of probabilities) and in criminal cases (beyond reasonable doubt).  Both of those tests are well understood by lawyers and juries, and the lawyers and judges are firmly discouraged from flirting with the wording or trying to prepare a gloss.  But in some civil cases, the consequences of an adverse finding may be so serious that the law imposes an intermediate level of proof which is somewhere between 50/50 and beyond reasonable doubt.

This law has always caused me problems on tribunals.  No one has been able to explain it to me satisfactorily.  All I do, I think, is try to ensure that in such cases that any finding I make which may, say, cost someone their job, is one that I can sleep with as not being unfair to a person who enjoys the presumption of innocence.

There is no science or formula in that – you just have to make a decision and be able to live with it.  I referred to the comment of Chief Justice Latham about needing more evidence to convict for murder than to hand out a parking ticket.  I suspect that my approach is similar to that which the Panel invoked, but in light of their actual decision, I cannot be sure.

The name of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is a characteristically arrogant misnomer.  Arbitrators are not judges, and their tribunals are not courts.  The whole bloody point of arbitration is to get away from courts and strict procedures, and to operate in confidence behind closed doors.  One of our great constitutional cases saw the High Court slap down industrial arbitrators getting ideas above their station and acting like judges or courts.  Two of the Panel would not know that, and the third may have forgotten it, but this little grab for power and respectability by this foreign outfit says a lot about its sponsors and champions.  The CAS is not within a bull’s roar of a court, and those who sit on it know it.  Or they bloody well ought to.

The CAS panels have nevertheless evolved their own standard of proof.  They have made their own law. In these cases, the standard is ‘comfortable satisfaction.’ We are told that this is a term of art, but the Panel did not seek to elucidate the meaning or indicate the reach of that term.  It is not part of Australian law, and it is important for people to understand that the most important aspect of this case – the degree of satisfaction before a finding of guilt can be made – is not made according to the law of Australia, but a doctrine developed by an international arbitral body – by gaggles of unelected foreign lawyers.  It is made under a law that the Panel did not elaborate on.  The Panel asked us to take this law on trust.  Should we do that?  Is it safe? Can we rely on them? Should we interrogate them?

There you have another reason why the AFL was very wrong to have adopted this process.

The Panel did not say whether the CAS doctrine was better or worse for the players or if it was different to the Australian law.  It merely said that it was satisfied to the required level.  You might in a bad dream put the required level somewhere between 51% and 99% and just say that at whatever point you draw the line, this Panel was satisfied that it had been reached.

In the course of its reasons, the Panel said expressly that ‘In so far as the Panel is sitting in Sydney, nonetheless, it is deemed to be sitting in Lausanne, and Swiss procedural law applies.’  I gather that that means that they apply the Swiss laws of evidence.  I know as much about those laws as a majority of the Panel knows about the laws of evidence of Australia.  Perhaps they are not bound by any rules of evidence.  There is nothing in the decision that suggests that they are, and there is a lot of hearsay and other material that would not be acceptable in a court.  These charges would never have got off the ground in a real court under our law.  This is another reason that this process is potentially diabolical for Australians.

It is not hard to come unstuck with these foreign arbitration agreements.  I heard a case in California about twenty years ago.  It involved a very large armaments contract.  The American buyer had allowed the Australian contractor to say that the contract would be governed by the laws of Australia, or the principal state where the contractor resided.  When the Americans applied for an interlocutory injunction, I wondered whether they were aware of our practice and procedure on such applications relating to what are called undertakings as to damages.  (The party asking for the temporary holding order has to promise to compensate the party restrained if it loses the case at the end.)  It became apparent in the course of the argument in Los Angeles that they were not.  They lost, and I did not have to deal with any complaints that were no doubt forthcoming about the drafting of this arbitration agreement that left the Americans exposed to findings under foreign laws that they did not properly understand.  (I might say that that clause was far more expeditious and lawyer-throttling than the Byzantine affair here.  The dispute had to be notified in five days and heard within ten days.  The hearing had to finish in a day, and the arbitrator had to give a decision that day or the next.  I commend this derailing of gravy trains.)

The Panel did however reject the proposition that the prosecution is obliged to ‘eliminate all possibilities’ which could point to innocence.  This is not my area of practice, and I do not know to what extent this means that the prosecution has to exclude any hypothesis consistent with innocence, or the like.  That is to say, I do not know whether this restriction makes the relevant Swiss law different to ours and if so how or why.

But the proposition remains.  The Panel says that the standard of proof imposed by the relevant foreign law is that of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ and then says, without more, that that standard has been reached in this case.

That mode of reasoning is hardly satisfactory intellectually to lawyers.  It will be even worse for the parties, because they are left up in the air about just how the process has been applied.  Has this Panel discharged its legal obligation to articulate fully and fairly the premises on which they hang their conclusion?

I must say that at best I am left in doubt on this question, and I notice from the press that I am not alone in feeling like being left up in the air.  The members of the first tribunal who knew more about the matters in issue were not so satisfied.  This panel was.  I am in trouble detecting the grounds of the distinction.  And if independent journalists are not convinced, where does that leave the players or Essendon supporters?

For my own part, I cannot understand how experienced lawyers could sleep easily after subjecting these players to these consequences on this evidence.  I find it very hard to resist the inference that it was WADA who got the benefit of the doubt, and not the players.  Well, Gentlemen, that is not the way we lawyers do things down here.

That brings me to another point.  In my view, the Code and this procedure are shockers for the players.  They are unduly loaded against the players.  As I said, someone advising the players independently would never have advised them to agree to anything like this.  I find it almost impossible to imagine a decent independent lawyer coming to a different view.

This Code looks to me to have been prepared for individual sports where cheating by drug use was out-of-control – like cycling, swimming, weightlifting, or athletics.  This Code is utterly inappropriate for people playing team sports in Australia.  It was developed where a very hard line could be and was taken and not resisted by those running the relevant sports – who have their own problems with corruption anyway.

I can say with considerable confidence that most independent lawyers on being briefed to conduct a hearing in a case like this against a whole team who were in substance being accused of cheating would, after about five minutes with the brief, have said to themselves: ‘Shit.  Who signed these poor bastards up to this?’  There is after all something odd about a jurisdiction that depends upon contract being exercised against people who have not separately, so far as I can see, agreed to the relevant arrangement.

There is simply no argument that this was a very bad wicket for the players to bat on.  Yet not once does the Panel make any comment about that fact, or show any morsel of sympathy, or one isotope of mercy.  They just sit on the conveyor belt and coldly and clinically take it to its destination.  The players do not take one trick, even though they had won by something close to a walkover the first time around.  It is all very unsettling and discomforting.

Now doubtless, the Panel would say that the failure of the players to take a trick is the proper result of the proper application of the Code.  The trouble with that response is that the players are footballers not jurists.  All that they know is that they lost on everything in a way that looks demonstrably unfair.  It is not for them to divine or define how they suffered that trainwreck.

There is one final point on the standard of proof.  On one issue, the players had the onus.  I have not found in the reasons any discussion of the standard of proof in that context.  The issue is fundamental.  This is another example of a bad Code at work.

9 How would this kind of issue be dealt with elsewhere?

How would this kind of case be dealt with elsewhere?  As it happens, I am in a position to give a reasonably confident answer to that question, at either end of town down here, for the benefit of our visitors.

Take a case occurring at what we call the Big End of town.  Let us say that some over-zealous executives have engaged in some trading that brings a bank into disrepute or bad odour with the regulator, and which might cause it to suffer what we fondly describe as reputational damage.  There has been real dishonesty.  Billions have gone west.  Innocent people have been badly hurt.  The regulator unleashes a squad of plods who miss the point, and both sides retain platoons of lawyers, PR consultants, and the rest.  At some time, the lawyers will get together in a dark room, and hammer out an agreement.  Millions or billions of dollars will be transferred to the Consolidated Revenue as some kind of a fine, or for costs, or pursuant to some kind of undertaking.  There may have to be a seal put on all this by a court, in which case you might see the most unedifying spectacle of the court agreed to accept a statement of facts agreed to by the lawyers for the parties, which may or may not occasionally bear some resemblance to the facts, or look like a composition of the Brontë sisters.  One way or another, the deal will be blessed.  No one will be publicly examined or humiliated.  The shareholders will just get a slightly lesser dividend, but the bonuses of the people concerned will not be affected.

The whole thing is utterly disgraceful, but it goes on all the time.  Somehow or other, our governments permit these deals to be done like this – in no small part, I think, because they are being bought off.  Even where there is litigation in matters alleged in court and the miscreant officers finally agree to settle, they go to huge lengths to document the transaction and to bury their role in it, so that their benevolence to the community remains monastic and anonymous.

I can speak with even more confidence about what might happen at the other end of town.  I have been dealing with disciplinary cases for the Melbourne Fire Brigade since about 2003.  I can say with considerable confidence that if a tribunal such as mine were to rub out firefighters on the basis of an offence of strict liability and a fixed penalty applied regardless of the level of personal culpability, then homeowners in Melbourne would want to pray that there was no fire during the succeeding period of civil industrial unrest that would arise while the Comrades expressed their solidarity until the firefighters were reinstated.  They would go out and stay out until the decision was withdrawn.

The football players, it seems, in this case, live in the worst of all possible worlds.  It is not unusual for our governments to provide more solace and protection to the privileged classes and the Establishment, than to people in the position of these players.  Equality is a myth foregone in our law.  Their additional misfortune is that their industry is not one where as yet they can exercise industrial muscle so as to meet outrages like this in the same way that orthodox trade unions would.  They are in a very bad no-man’s land – somewhere between here and Lausanne.  They are what terrorists call soft targets.

10 What was the nature of the CAS inquiry?

There are rules about cheating.  They are meant to protect other competitors, and to maintain standards.  They are enforced to protect people at large, and not to punish those found guilty of cheating.  Punishment is reserved for the courts.  The CAS is a disciplinary tribunal, and not a court.  Tribunals like that have no power to punish.  Their role is simply to protect those interested in the sports that seek their intervention.

This power is similar to the power of the Court to discipline a barrister, which our High Court has said is ‘entirely protective, and, notwithstanding that each exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there is no element of punishment involved.’ In so holding (New South Wales bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117C L R 177) the High Court overruled the Supreme Court of New South Wales which had held that ‘as the exercise of its disciplinary powers was, to some extent, a punishment for wrongdoing, mercy might be shown toward a young man who had not understood the error of his ways.’

Even putting aside the word ‘mercy’, this ruling at first sight might appear to be against the interests of the Essendon players.  The reverse is the case, in my view.  What that ruling says is that the role of the tribunal is to enforce discipline for protective purposes.  For protection against what?  Cheating.  But there was no finding of cheating.  The Code says point blank that no fault or intent need be found.  All that this tribunal did was to make a finding on strict liability and then clear the way for the application of a mandatory sentence to take effect, irrespective of the justice in each of the thirty-four separate cases.  The whole object of this scheme in this Code is to banish judgement on any conduct or its consequences and then confine the tribunal to brute facts and ineluctable consequences.  To discover if cheating occurred, we have I think just to trust WADA.

There are good reasons why the Panel may not have referred to this part of our law.  One is that the majority did not know about it because they do not practise our law.  Another is that our law probably does not apply in this hearing.  Another is that even if it did, it was probably displaced by the provisions of the Code.  Is that a good result for Australia?

It is a shame, though, because a reflection on this part of our law may have caused the Panel to reflect more deeply on just what it was doing and why.  Justice Holmes said that our law started with looking for someone to blame.  Before you do that, you need to point to some harm for which the person is to be blamed.  The Panel did not undertake any such enquiry.

Had they done so they may have inquired about the utility of their role if the only relevant harm was the risk undertaken by the players as a result of putting their trust in their employer.  It is hard to explain why the Panel did not say at least something about how utterly inappropriate and unfair was the operation of the Code in this case.  What was the purpose of rubbing these guys out?  What has WADA and the CAS achieved?  What good have they done for the people of Australia?

Did the CAS ask the correct question in this case?

11 The pressures applied

I have no personal knowledge of the pressures brought to bear on these players during these proceedings, but after more than 40 years acting for or against bodies like the VFL, the AFL or these regulators, I have some understanding of how they operate.  When I acted for the VFL in the first half of the 1980s, the late Jack Hamilton was an immensely shrewd and capable administrator.  At any one time, he was surrounded by 12 men who were looking to knife him in the back, and he would walk across the town from Jolimont to visit us because he needed the fresh air and because he did not trust the phones.

The monolith that the AFL is now is a very, very different beast, and the problem that we have is the same that we have with almost any large corporation.  They become utterly soulless.  Their leaders have immense egos and equally immense needs to save face.  Most of them quickly forget how they got there.  There are many words that you do not mention in these boardrooms.  Two of them are humility and compassion.  I have no doubt that the AFL acted in a brutally arrogant and self-protective fashion in this case.  For the reasons that I have given, or tried to give, the AFL in my view does have a lot of explaining to do.

The regulators tend to be different.  They have a chip on their shoulder because they are not respected and they are about as popular as parking attendants.  They are generally unloved, and in this case they appeared to be totally useless.

The bullying of the regulators has, I am ashamed to say, a legal backing.  I have described how large corporations cut deals involving millions of dollars to protect their senior people – and to rip off their shareholders.  That is for the most part a privilege of only the rich in this country. This serene deal–cutting at the expense of others is not available to lesser mortals – like the Essendon footballers.

At that level, what is called plea bargaining operates very differently.  ‘Either, Sportsman, you agree to play ball with us and bow your head and say sorry – even for something that you deny doing – or we will throw the book at you and make life hell for you and you will be three times worse off – and let us tell you, Sportsman, that we have been given all the tools we need to be just as brutal as we like.’ One of the more awful consequences of this part of the failure of our law is that it gives the power to act as judge and jury to precisely those people who will abuse that power.

It is not hard to find examples of regulators offering deals at the end of a gun or heavying people for exercising their legal rights.  Here is an example from the press in 2014 when the players lost in the Federal Court after the AFL squashed a Supreme Court challenge.  John Fahey, a former politician, and former president of WADA, attacks people for challenging authority in the context of the refusal of a deal offered by the local regulator.

“I welcome the Federal Court’s decision,” Fahey said.

“The governments of 194 countries have accepted the code in support of clean and ethical athletes and officials. To me it was beyond belief that one club in one city of one of those countries would believe the rules should not apply to them.

“It is time certain people with big egos and fat wallets threw them both in the drawer and started focusing on 34 young men and their future in sport.

“Refusing to face reality only increases the likelihood of longer suspensions for the players. I sincerely hope that common sense now comes into play.”

By arguing in Federal Court that ASADA’s investigation into Essendon was unlawful, club chairman Paul Little – under increased pressure given the events of the week – and Hird hoped the 34 show-cause notices issued to past and present Bomber players would be annulled…..

When these show-cause notices were issued by ASADA in June, the agency’s new CEO, Ben McDevitt, tabled an option that might have resulted in the players serving backdated bans and resume playing from round one next year, provided they accepted they took the banned drug.

Well, there you have a politician being a heavy-handed politician, and a regulator being a heavy-handed regulator, both unattractively.  Fahey was hopelessly wrong, which is not uncommon, but in the events that have happened we now see that the players have suffered twice the penalty that they could have suffered.  Why?  Because they refused to bow their heads and play the game as their enemies wanted them to do.  They had been impertinent enough to seek the views of Her Majesty’s judges.  Is that your idea of justice?

I have had to deal with this problem in thirty years of sitting on tribunals, and I am very often deeply ashamed of what might go on.  No one – not the most senior of Law Offices or Crown Prosecutors – has ever been able to explain to me how offering a discount for pleading guilty does not constitute enforcing a penalty against someone who exercises their civil rights and pleads not guilty.  This is a travesty, and a breach of that constitutional document made 801 years ago that says that our government will not sell, deny, or delay justice to us.  This particular travesty arises from another failure – to ensure that our justice system can cope without having to pressure people – or at least ordinary people – to surrender their rights.

There was another and better-known part of Magna Carta, the clause that says ‘we will not go or send against’ any man ‘except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.’  The pressures brought on these Essendon players are simply another part of the injustice that they have suffered.  It is just wrong for anyone to accuse them of seeking legal redress unnecessarily, when their rights have been so often infringed, and when they are only where they are now because the enemy was allowed a second bite at the cherry.

I think the one thing that is common ground here is that the players have been put through hell for years.  God only knows what troubles we might see as a result.

12 We are not talking about sport

The regulators seek to give themselves a gloss by saying that they are protecting sport.  Anyone who claims that role in any part of this planet at this time is courting contempt for reasons I will come to.  But in this case, we are not talking about sport.  We are talking about people plying a trade in a part of the entertainment industry called professional football, and we are talking about people being run out of that trade by regulators and having their lives and reputations ruined.  This is too bloody serious is to be dismissed as sport.

We are talking of sport that is conducted as a business – that is, for profit.  For too long now, bodies like IAAF, IOC, FIFA and ICCB have been competing to see who can show themselves to be the most corrupt and untrustworthy. You would likely defame someone if you said they were a sports administrator.   Blatter is just the most obvious at the moment.  There are shockers everywhere, and what is most shocking is the sublime and undeniable arrogance of those who stay on even after the Titanic has hit the iceberg.

You can see this even now in the AFL and CA.  You could see it with the Adolf Hitler reaction to an eight year suspension by Blatter.  What was more revolting was the ban itself.  Presumably this stunt was perpetrated in the belief that the little crook will die in the meantime.  Is any administrator in the world going to ask anyone in the world to believe that if Blatter lives for eight years, he will somehow become trustworthy?  These galahs just live in a different world.

Just look at what has happened.  We now have a bookie sponsoring a grand slam tennis event – when match-fixing reaches tennis.  The march of live betting looks unstoppable in a nation already corrupted by pokies and dependent governments.  Cricket has been junking itself since Mr Packer arrived and has now plumbed a new depth with 20/20.  The Australian authorities chickened out in the face of Indian bullying, and later joined a cartel with India and England to carve up the game – and the moulah.  The players behave badly – but not as badly as the tennis players.  Armstrong was a serial bully, liar, and crook who has cast doubt on about every person who excels in sport.  Which ‘sport’ is the most corrupt?  And look what replays have done to umpiring and what betting ads have done to our last hope of decency.

It is about two generations since any responsible or sane parent could suggest to their children that they might have a role model in one of the sports heroes.  Harvey, Coleman, Rosewall, Thomson, Elliott, and Brabham are gone from our sporting lives, and sport went out the window with them.  There is hardly any such thing as innocence in any professional sport, and any functionary claiming to have achieved it is living in one of those bubbles of delusion for which they are properly derided.

13 Lindy Chamberlain

Let us look at some of the more obvious points of similarity.  Both cases involved complicated circumstantial evidence.  They both involved difficult expert evidence.  The accused in each case were heavily attacked over differing accounts they had given of aspects of the case.  The legal system showed itself to be seriously flawed in each case.  In each case it took a long time for the truth to come out.  Despite all these sources of difficulty, nearly everyone in Australia had a view on the case, and once they had adopted that position, they hung onto it like a koala on a gum-tree branch in a cyclone.  There is an iron law at work.  The most ignorant are the loudest.  There is bullshit everywhere.  Justice ultimately came out, thank God, in the first case.  We must wait to see if it happens in the present case.

May I be allowed two comments?  I said that the case of Lindy Chamberlain showed flaws in the legal system.  The verdict was appealed right through to the High Court of Australia.  Two Justices analysed in great detail the problems with the Crown case which in their view made the verdict insupportably unsafe.  The majority of the Court was not sufficiently moved to disturb the verdict.  The obvious policy of respecting the verdict of a jury on issues of fact won out for them.  There were therefore very substantial juristic and policy reasons for the division in the High Court which we can now see as showing a flaw in the system which was only cured after a Royal Commission.  I have not seen any justification for what I regard as serious failures of the legal system here.

The second thing is that Lindy Chamberlain was criticised for what she said and how she reacted.  No one could ever tell me what the textbook mode of reaction is for a mother who has had her child taken and killed, and who is then falsely accused of having murdered her own child.  What, then, is the textbook reaction of professional footballers who have been wilfully let down and deceived by their club and who are then falsely accused of cheating?

14 Who or what is WADA?

WADA is an emanation of the IOC.  That is not a good start.  The Thought Police have to be cleaner than the wife of Caesar.  How does WADA go about that?

The business of athletics has been notoriously badly run for years.  Its administration has been corrupt, and its athletes have been drugged.  Russia, not surprisingly, has been a serial offender.  The whole sport is rotten.

WADA was commissioned to enquire into IAAF.  It produced a most damning report that documented cases of officials extorting bribes to cover up positive drug tests which had allowed drug cheats to continue competing.  It found breaches that extended ‘to criminal acts of conspiracy, corruption and bribery within the organisation’s leadership.  WADA is alarmed that this ultimately allowed doped athletes to evade punishment and sanctioning for a long period of time.’  When a body has been gripped by corruption for years, as this one had been, it is impossible for those directing it to say that they should not be held responsible.  They knew or should have known – this is the VW dilemma.  You would therefore expect all of the board to resign if they had one iota of decency or, for that matter, one iota of respect for athletics.  And you would expect WADA to back those resignations.

One of those directors is the famous athlete Sebastian Coe.  Surely WADA would expect him to resign.  No, Mate. After he had handed down the report, Mr Dick Pound, a former head of WADA, said that Lord Coe was the man for the job to lead the shattered IAAF back to health.  This was so even though as a director of IAAF, Coe was looking straight down the barrel of a WADA finding of ‘a complete breakdown of governance structures and accountability.’  Interpol immediately issued a warrant for the man Coe will replace as president.

The IAAH has its HQ in Monaco.  Tax and the climate, old boy.  Coe had eulogised the previous president.  The current IOC chief comes from Adidas.  He is a mate of Putin and Coe.  He says – of course – that Russia should be there in Rio.  Coe was with the other team, Nike, and he wanted to stay on with them as president of IAAF.  Just think of the size of the store-rooms for brown paper bags at Adidas and Nike.  The Pound Report – it is thrillingly described as ‘Independent’ – said that Coe’s mate and right hand man Nick Davies was well aware of Russian skeletons.  Dick Pound is also an IOC veteran.  It looks like Seb got a heads-up on how Dick would respond.  He looked serenely relaxed during the press conference – as he looked at his luxury watch.  (And what a blue to be spotted with one of those on in an outfit like the IAAF.)  Coe’s predecessor is headed for the slammer.  He employed two sons at IAAF and his lawyer looked after anti-doping.  It will be a real hoot when his lawyer tenders Coe’s eulogy as character evidence.  Serious Groucho Marx stuff.

It is hard to imagine a clearer case of a breach of fiduciary duties.  How on earth can anyone expect this body to clean up its act if it is now being entrusted to the leadership of someone who was there on the board all the time when it got into the mess from which it now has to be extricated?  Will he sit on judgment on himself?  When will he be implicated next?  Is this just not another case of members of the Old Boys’ Club looking after each other?  In the name of heaven, this man is a champion, a lord, and has been presented to the Queen.  Well, yes, old boy, but, you see, appearances matter, and the fact is that he was there when the ship started to sink, and no one will trust us if we leave him now in charge at the wheel.

Instead we get bullshit like the following from one sports administrator:

We reiterate our unwavering stance against doping in sport and require that the IAAF, under the leadership of president Seb Coe to take all actions necessary to deliver a level playing field for all athletes, worldwide.  We want to see real action before Rio 2016.  We acknowledge that there is an enormous amount to do to restore the credibility of the sport of athletics.  We share the confidence that the President of the Independent Commission, Dick Pound, has placed in Sebastian Coe as the right person to lead the IAAF into a new era.

Pound’s endorsement is in neon.  They want to murder language as well as ethics.  His Lordship said:

I am extremely grateful to the WADA Independent Commission for its work and for the recommendations it has made.  The corruption that it has revealed is totally abhorrent, and a gross betrayal of trust by those involved.  Even though each of the impacted doping cases was eventually resolved with lengthy bans for the athletes involved, I recognise that the IAAF still has an enormous task ahead of it to restore public confidence.  We cannot change the past, but I am determined that we will learn from it and will not repeat its mistakes.

Coe was involved in the breach of trust.  The Russians should be rubbed out.  Their defence is that everyone’s a crook.  Well, it looks like everyone at IAAF was.  How can you try to act tough against a thug like Putin when you don’t even look pure?  If Dyson Heydon had come across a stunt like this in a union official, he would have gone troppo about errant fiduciaries – and he would have been right.

Dick Pound is one of those ‘holier than thou ‘guys who has been around sermonising for years.  He will lecture people about ethics at the drop of a hat.  It is apparently too much to ask that he might know better.  When I saw Dick Pound endorse his failed buddy Seb Coe on TV, for some reason my mind straight way turned to those glorious lines of Queen Margaret:

And where’s that valiant crookback prodigy,

Dicky, your boy, that with his grumbling voice

Was wont to cheer his dad in mutinies?

What you see here again is the incredible, unstoppable arrogance of sports administrators.  They will never own up.  They are too thick or too proud to enjoy a term and a style less than that of the average African dictator.

This is how The Guardian called it.

When the killer question came, Dick Pound gently rocked on his seat and took a discreet breath. “Given what you have said about the IAAF council, and that it must have known what was going on in Russia, do you believe Lord Coe’s position remains tenable?” he was asked.

There was a deliberate pause. Everyone knew Sebastian Coe’s tender career as the head of global athletics was at his mercy. A few damning words would have pulverised it. Instead Pound, that ice-veined investigator of Russia’s sporting corruption only two months ago, put a warm protective cloak around the IAAF president. And so a week that started with Coe on the ropes ended with him receiving an unexpected dose of smelling salts.

“I think it’s a fabulous opportunity for the IAAF to seize this opportunity and under strong leadership to move forward,” explained Pound, whose former role as an outspoken head of the World Anti-Doping Agency gives his words more credibility than most. “There is an enormous amount of reputational recovery that has to occur here but I can’t think of anyone better than Lord Coe to lead that.”

You could almost hear the sound of jaws plummeting through the floor of the Dolce Munich Hotel and into the basement. Understandably so.

Apparently, it takes a crook to catch a crook. The truth is, is it not, that you what would not believe one word of any one of these whackers said, even the word ‘the’.  What credence would I give to any pronouncement of WADA?  Any of the following – nil, nought, nix, zilch, or Sweet Fanny Adams.

We might have known we would have problems with Seb as the IAAF president when he refused to give up his Nike contract.  A kind of ethical blindness falls over the eyes of people when they take a job like this.  But Seb holds an ace at IAAF.  The guy he just beat for the job was a pole-vaulter from the Ukraine.  Putting a Ukrainian pole-vaulter in charge of a corrupt athletics body might be a little like putting a drunk in charge of a distillery.  Seb’s predecessor came from Senegal and was in the chair for sixteen years.  Seb says he did not know of corruption.  Seriously.  His Lordship really is playing with the faith of fifty million people, to adopt that well-known comment in The Great Gatsby.

Meanwhile, 34 young Australian have been put out of work at the instance of WADA, and one very compromised English lord is hanging on to an office he should not hold on the spontaneous endorsement of his mate, WADA’s boy, Dicky.  And two of the three wise men have gone back to Lausanne or London confident that they have taught those commoner yokels down there a thing or two about how people on top of the world look after things.

Those who seek to persecute Essendon might wish to reflect on the company they keep.  The trouble with all these outfits is the same.  If you lie down with dogs, you get up with fleas.  ‘Reputational recovery’ – what a preposterous term! – is out of the bloody question.  Give us a bloody break, Dicky.

And then there is this pearler.  How will this little duet between Dicky and Seb go down at Windy Hill?  They are broken on the wheel because they got conned; Lord Seb presided over crooks for a decade and flies on.  And it’s all thanks to Dicky and his mates.

There is one final point about this foreign enforcer.  When emanations of government in this country engage in litigation, they are customarily subject to expectations and protocols about how they should conduct themselves in dealing with the people who have entrusted them with power, and who pay their bills.  We don’t get that protection when we are dealing with guns for hire from out of town.  Just as the CAS is not a court, so WADA is not one our enforcers.  We might hope that people who are here on sufferance might behave more circumspectly.

15 A vicious, totalitarian law

As I said, this Code was not made for this kind of case.  It was made to deal with established crooks.  The word Draconian is abused, but here we have a real one.  This lot would make Putin blush and Stalin jealous.  All we are missing is the midnight knock on the door.

We have seen that WADA does not have to prove fault but the players have to prove its absence in order to beat the max – irrespective, we are told, of the justice of each case.  You will find these sweeping blankets in anti-avoidance tax acts, and they have proved notoriously difficult to keep under control.  The first reaction of the judges is to say that the parliament could not really mean what they have said, and there then follows the kind of minuet that I have referred to.

But the better analogy here is legislation designed to deal with terrorism or organised crime.  There are well known models for such laws.  They are deliberately savage to deal with savage people.  The consequent risks to our civil liberties are equally well known.

The level of corruption in sports administration is as notorious as the use of drugs in so many sports.  What we have here is the extreme reaction of an officialdom seen to be inept or corrupt in dealing with widespread drug use.  This savage law is aimed at presumed crooks.  That is why it is drawn from the start to override the basis of our law – where people are presumed to be innocent – and reverse the onus of proof.  ‘We will pay the best legal minds to create a bullet-proof wagon to skin any bastard that gets in our way.’  And the invasions of rights and obvious injustices predictably follow.

It is an outrage that Australians should be subjected to such a dreadful foreign law.

Let me give you some examples of how these guys operate.  I cannot recall seeing one decision of our courts referred to by this Panel.  They hand up lots of Latin and oodles of cases of themselves, the CAS.  They presumably were decisions made by lawyers appointed as arbitrators.  We do not know who these people are or what their qualifications or predilections might be.  Do we have the same trust in them that we have in Her Majesty’s Australian judges who have the invaluable protection of the Act of Settlement and who conduct their proceedings in the cauterising glare of public office and public scrutiny?  Not on your bloody Nelly, Mate.

Well, what kind of doctrine gets propounded by these anonymous piece-work hot-shots who now rule the lives of our athletes?  Here is a quote from another CAS Panel on the contentious subject of the duty of an athlete to inquire about what they are taking.  (You will of course bear in mind that the consent form so heavily relied on by WADA and the Panel said point-blank ‘All components of the intervention/s are in compliance with current WADA anti-doping policy and guidelines…’)

It is not open to an athlete simply to say ‘I took what I was given by my doctor who I trusted’… At the very least, an athlete who has been given medicines by a doctor should specifically ask to be informed of what are the contents of those medicines.  He should ask whether the medicines contain any prohibited substance.  He should attempt to obtain written confirmation from the doctor that the medicines do not contain any prohibited substances.

It will no doubt be objected that to require an athlete to ask such questions and to obtain such confirmation would be to place too heavy a burden on the athlete.  The Panel rejects such an objection.  It rarely, if ever, is the case that medicines are given to an athlete in circumstances in which it would not be possible for him to ask such questions or to obtain such confirmation.

If an athlete wants to persuade an anti-doping tribunals, or CAS panel, that he has been found to have a prohibited substance anybody, but that he was not at fault or negligent, or that he was not substantially at fault or negligent, he must do more than simply rely on his doctor.

This is what lawyers call a gloss on a law or rule.  It is a commentary that if accepted as a precedent comes to be accepted as law.  It is a law made by unelected foreigners in this case.  Do you think that that is a fair and good law to be applied to Australian athletes?  If so, do you think that it is appropriate to apply such a law simply by having it imported in here by foreign tribunals?  If so, how do you suggest that athletes might go about finding out about this law?  For that matter, how might their lawyers go about finding out about this law?  More importantly, is this a sensible kind of law to apply to the workings of an AFL football club that has a resident doctor?

For that matter, how do we know if the lawyers who succeed in getting their pronouncements adopted into de facto law are up to it?  Whose word do we trust on that question?  Are we right to have our athletes subjected to rules and the enforcement of those rules by people we have never heard of and who are beyond our control and outside our jurisdiction?

I suspect that the international thought police would say that local bodies could not be trusted.  I can understand that as a general and historical proposition.  But we are not some jumped up banana republic that is mired in corruption.  We are a mature, civilised nation that has a respect for the rule of law that is unequalled and we produce far more than out share of the best sports people in the world.  It is madness that we should entrust them to outsiders who do not know us or our way of life and who may well not share the principles we live by.

Let me give another example of how Australian lawyers might have difficulty in following this kind of law–making.  The players naturally objected that WADA should not be able to change its case, and they referred to a part of the code that on one view would preclude this.  ‘The Panel considers that the provision in Article R56 of the Code purposively construed draws a distinction between re-formulating an existing argument and advancing a new and distinctive argument.  It is inherent in the forensic process that sometimes a party’s argument is developed and at other times discarded.’ The Panel then went on to reject the submission of the players, as they did almost every submission made on behalf of the players.

One of the additional grounds that they gave is that the players were ‘estopped’ from advancing their submission.  Estoppel is a doctrine of our law that says that if you state your position and the other side relies on that statement and changes its position, you may be precluded later from changing your own position.   We commonly regard that law as being part of the law of evidence.  If so, as I follow it, then the Swiss law would be applied here: if the CAS has any laws of evidence.  I may be wrong on that, for more than one reason, but I have no idea of what the Swiss law of estoppel says.  I have no idea of what law of estoppel the Panel was applying because they did not say.  Is this a fair and sensible way to conduct a process as a result of which people are deprived of their livelihood?

Let me give you another example of something that happened in this case that would horrify Australian lawyers acting in the ordinary course of their practice.  The Panel had to deal with an argument that the scientific evidence that was new in the rehearing should not have been admitted because it was available to ASADA at the first hearing.  Part of the answer to that was: ‘However, it should be noted that Wada was not a party to the proceedings below.’  New player, new ball game.  We know that, but to suggest that that means that the ordinary rules should be disregarded here seems at best odd.  This is another example of this process arriving at results that for the ordinary common lawyer would provoke about the same reaction as if you went in and saw your GP, and the GP said that you should treble your consumption of fats, smoke two packets of cigarettes a day, drink at least one bottle of Scotch a day, and cease all exercise.

Over the objection of the players, WADA was allowed to introduce fresh scientific evidence.  Two members of the Panel did not know how dud science brought Lindy Chamberlain down.  This was just another submission of the accused that failed.

The Panel’s conclusion on this contest of experts is simple.  None of the Players’ experts, whether in the field of medicine or statistics, could rule out the possibility that TB-4 in Player A’s Sample was the product of exogenous administration.  But that falls far short of an acceptance that such possibility could justify the Panel, being comfortably satisfied that it did, and Professor Handelsman for his part could not rule out the possibility that the elevated levels of T B-4 in Player A’s Sample was endogenous.

Was it not just both stupid and insulting for these so very clever lawyers to say that its conclusion was ‘simple’?

And for the first time in more than forty years, I think I saw an invocation of the de minimis rule – against the players, again.  When I put that to a federal judge here forty years ago, he just gave me a long look and told me to move on.  I was very fond of that judge.  He said to me, more than once: ‘Mr Gibson, you are too young for this, but during the war, the trains had a sign: Is this journey really necessary?’  That is precisely what goes through your mind when reading the decision of the Panel.  What sort of people could inflict this pain and complexity on us?

Here is another problem with the Code.  The wallopers do not have to prove intent or cheating.  But the onus is on the accused to show innocence.  This then allows the tribunal to make assessments on both the conduct and the credit of the players.  The players are in the worst of all worlds, as when they get a backhander about the players’ evidence showing an economy with the truth.  And then there is the grand-daddy of all backhanders when we come to what an outsider might think should have been the whole point of the case.  Did Essendon get an advantage?

While no Player who gave evidence before the Panel accepted that the substance administered by Mr Dank had any beneficial effect, Essendon had conspicuous success at the start of the 2012 season, winning eight out of the first nine games of the season before being destabilized by a series of injuries.  While there could of course be many other factors for such team success, it could be argued on that basis that the proof of the substance was in the taking.  While the Panel is content to treat this as a barely visible thread rather than a strand, the factor is at least not inconsistent with their overall conclusion.

That is, if I may say so, not the way responsible judges should conduct themselves.  The charges made do not call for a consideration of this point.  But against what is conceded to be the total weight of the evidence, these three people, who between them know nothing at all about AFL football, speculate – and it is speculation – that the success of Essendon early in the season is such that ‘it could be argued on that basis that the proof of the substance was in the taking,’, having conceded of course that there could be many other ‘factors’ (a weasel word) for what had happened.  The Panel then goes on to say that it is content to treat this ‘as a barely visible thread rather than a strand,’ and that this observation, speculative and uninformed as it is, is at least not inconsistent with their overall conclusion.

Are the livelihoods of our footballers to be subjected to this kind of hypothetical claptrap?  Do their reputations hang by a barely visible thread?  If a barrister tried this sort of stunt in a court, they would be accused of poisoning the well, and subjected to an application to discharge a jury, and very likely get referred to the Stipes.  Just what point was the Panel trying to make?  Even their unwarranted speculation is predicated on a logical fallacy which the Panel will be familiar with under its Latin tag post hoc ergo propter hoc. 

They are examples of how this Code, which in its conception is so bad for the players, was so hard for them to deal with in this case.  The Essendon players look to me to have had about as much chance in this contest as they would had if they had been sent to play gridiron in New York or lacrosse, or whatever the Swiss play, in Lausanne.

Judging from the history of this Code, and its objectives, what you have in this Code and CAS lore is a savage response by officialdom in an endeavour to make up for generations of corruption and incompetence on its part across all sports all around the world.  That misbehaviour still rocks on at the highest levels, but these innocent Essendon bunnies just get flushed down the dunny as part of officialdom’s ‘reputational recovery’.

It stinks to heaven.  Even Lord Sebastian could see that.

I have a comfortable satisfaction with that conclusion.  I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on another.  None of the Essendon players who have been rubbed out will be able to follow the Panel’s reasons.  We have a big problem when people lose their job under a law and a process that they do not understand.  That is real Russian serf stuff, and we lawyers should be deeply ashamed that this kind of thing can go on.

Lord Sebastian might even be able to see that too.  If his mate Dicky lets him.

That leads me to use a term that I thought that I never would or could use.  National pride.  Who invited the bloody Swiss, a nation that specialises in living off immoral earnings?  Why on earth should I have to sit here and be lectured on sport by three blow-in galahs – a silk from England, a nation of shop-keepers, a silk from Belgium, a nation of chocolate-makers, and a silk with a call-up, stand-in cameo role from the convict colony?

More fundamentally, is it not revolting for Australians to be told that they can’t be trusted to run their own sport or to control their own athletes?

16 The terms of the decision and some irony

There are aspects of the wording of the decision which will give a lot of lawyers pause.  Some years ago, as it happens, I wrote a little book about arbitration, and at the risk of immodesty, which is an occupational hazard in this case, perhaps I might refer to something that I said about how arbitrators should prepare what they call the award, which is the decision in an arbitration.

The arbitrator should, therefore, prepare the award with care.  It is an occasion for intellectual honesty – put otherwise, having the courage of your convictions – but it may be as well to recall the observation made by one English judge to the effect that the most important person in a court is the loser.  It is a fundamental requirement of decency, if not procedural fairness, that the loser knows fairly and squarely how the arbitrator reached that result, but it is rarely necessary to express findings in terms that the losing party or witness may find it difficult to live with afterwards.

When drafting orders of the court that require people to do something, judges are very careful because they know the system will come into disrepute if the court publishes something that is not clear or leaves the parties in doubt.  Arbitrators should be guided by the same attitude.  So far as possible they should prepare awards that leave nothing for questioning or speculation.

Do you think that that is a fair description of how people deciding an arbitration should proceed?  If so, how do you think the Panel rates in its decision in this case?

You will be tiring of my querying how this Panel approached its task.  I am as much troubled by what they did not say as by what they did say.  There are obviously serious questions about whether a strict application of this Code as this Panel and the CAS at large interpret it had to lead to what most lawyers and others would say is an unjust and unreasonable result.

The inference I draw is that CAS appointed arbitrators do not see it as being part of their function to query the Code or WADA or their role in dealing with either of them.  That I think is a shame.  If that is the case, and the appointed arbitrators just do what they must with the materials that they are given, and without their personal or professional reflection on the worth or merit of their actions – how is their follow-the-leader model different to that which they condemned the players for following?

There is another irony.  The Panel decision, as I said, was written by lawyers for lawyers.  I find it very hard to follow.  I have no doubt that the players could not follow it.  (I put to one side whether a court might find the decision to be unlawful on that ground.)  The Panel’s understanding of Essendon footballers in 2012 is at best opaque, but the Panel could not have believed that the players would or could read this decision.  It follows that the Panel knew that the players would have to rely on their lawyers to explain to them what this decision means, and what they can do about it.  The players will just have to take on trust what they are told by people they trust, and then act accordingly.  That is not so far from the position that the players were in put in that started this human landslide.  The difference of course is that this time the players will not have to suffer the process and sanctions under the Code if those they trust get it wrong.  They will just be subject to the laws of Australia.

17 Disclaimers

I could be quite wrong in everything that I have said.  I have not had as much time as those professionally involved in the case to acquaint myself with the relevant law or evidence.  Neither is easy to follow.  I have not been able to follow the reasoning of the Panel in many instances and that failing may be down to me.  In particular, I have no knowledge of how this procedure could bind individual players, or what part the AFL played in that process.  I do not understand the connection between WADA and the Code or between either and CAS.  For the reasons I have given, this Code is in my view vicious to players, and those responsible for exposing the players to this process do in my opinion have a lot to answer for.  But even with those necessary caveats, I can say that in more than forty years practice I have never seen a more confused, toxic, and diabolical forensic mess.

18 Conclusions

The Essendon players are the victims of a witchhunt.  The following quote comes from a paper I wrote many years ago called Witchhunts and Holy Wars.  Each is a sure sign of a failure of civilisation.  The HUAC was the notorious House of Un-American Activities Committee – it stood for McCarthy or McCarthyism.  We see a bit of that around here.  This quote deals with the assault on that great American playwright, Arthur Miller.

The failure of due process before the HUAC takes your breath away, but it got worse before the courts.  When people were charged with contempt for refusing to answer, the trials did not take long.  The prosecution called expert evidence. They called an ‘expert on Communism’ to testify that the accused had been under ‘communist discipline’.  When Miller’s counsel announced he was going to call his expert to say that Miller had not been under discipline of the Communist Party, Miller noticed ‘that from then on a negative electricity began flowing toward me from the bench and the government table.’  Miller thought his expert was good, ‘but obviously the tracks were laid and the train was going to its appointed station no matter what.’  The nation that would have been entitled to see itself as having the most advanced constitutional protection of civil rights on earth had been scared out of its senses by a big bad bear that existed mostly in the minds of the tormented.

The Essendon players have been feeling negative electricity all along their nightmare ride on the WADA conveyor belt.

Hundreds of years ago, there was a sign on the main court building then in London called the Chancery.  That sign read:

It is the refuge of the poor and afflicted, it is the altar and sanctuary for such as against the might of rich men, and the countenance of great men, cannot maintain the goodness of their cause.

It could bring a tear to your eye.  That’s our good side.  Dickens described our bad side, and the bad side of Chancery, in Bleak House.  He said that the one great principle of English law is to make business for itself.

There is no issue about what side the enemies of Essendon are on.  They are on the side of the countenance of great men and on the side of the business of the law being to make business for itself.  The AFL, ASADA, WADA and CAS have jointly fuelled one of the greatest gravy trains for lawyers that this nation has ever seen.  Their conduct is disgraceful on that ground alone.  It is enough to make taxpayers and footy fans throw up.  As a lawyer, I am ashamed.

One thing has to be said about all the regulators.  They would not know the meaning of professional detachment.  On the night the CAS decision came down, John Fahey, an Australian politician who became president of WADA after Pound, was on TV fairly glowing and crowing and a representative of ASADA appeared to be undergoing some kind of religious revelation behind a pulpit.

There are whole libraries written about due process.  The rules of procedural fairness (or natural justice, or due process) mean that a person accused of infringing a rule must get a fair go.  Most Australians understand what this means and it should not be necessary to refer to what the judges have said about it. (The one thing the judges have made clear is that what amounts to a fair go depends on all of the circumstances in each case.)

I have tried to set out above why I do not think that these Essendon players got a fair go – or anything like it.  Putting to one side problems I have with the reasoning of the Panel, the major points on the failure of due process are:  They should never have had to face charges on these issues that did not call for proof of intent.  They should never have had to face fixed penalties.  They should never have been required to exculpate themselves on penalty once a finding on strict liability had been made.  They should never have been faced with a second prosecution after they succeeded on the first.  The prosecutors should not have been allowed to change their case.  The identical sentences for very different cases are demonstrably unjust and logically untenable.

There are six basic objections.  I regard the last as incontestable.  Any one would in my view preclude a finding of due process.  The only way to meet them is to say that the Code allowed if not required each such decision.  If that is so, how can the AFL justify exposing its players to those infringements on our civil rights that we all take for granted?  How does the AFL say that it looked after its players by exposing them to a hazard that no lawyer would have advised them to accept?

The AFL has behaved appallingly, but they got one thing right before the Panel – even though, I suspect, they knew that they might get hanged for it in court.  They told the Panel that ‘there is no suggestion that any player intended to use a prohibited substance’ and that if the Panel were to find that any player had used such a substance – not that the player had intended to use such a substance – ‘it was because he was the unwilling and unwitting victim of the gross negligence of others.’  Given those submissions, which the Panel did not reject, is it contended that the suspensions of these players is anything but an offence to both sense and decency?

As an advocate, you know you are for the high jump when the bench says that your argument is ‘clever’, or ‘ingenious’ or ‘nuanced’.  The argument has been utterly unpersuasive.  That is what we got from the Panel.  An argument that is clever, ingenious, and nuanced, but delivered with anal exactitude – and it is utterly unpersuasive.  The other word is bullshit.

There has been a lot of bullshit by hairy-chested regulators, administrators, and lawyers.  We are talking of a loss of rights that define not just what we understand by the rule of law, but are part of the fibre of western civilisation.  It is just wrong to flirt with the first principles of our law.  I would like to refer to some well-known words of the greatest jurist that this country has seen, Sir Owen Dixon.

The demands made in the name of justice must not be arbitrary or fanciful.  They must proceed, not from political or sociological propensities, but from deeper, more ordered, more philosophical and perhaps more enduring conceptions of justice.  Impatience at the pace with which legal developments proceed must be restrained because of graver issues.  For if the alternative to the judicial administration of the law according to a received technique and by the use of the logical faculties is the abrupt change of conceptions according to personal standards or theories of justice and convenience which the judge sets up, then the Anglo-American system would seem to be placed at risk.  The better judges would be set adrift with neither moorings nor chart.  The courts would come to exercise an unregulated authority over the fate of men and their affairs which would leave our system undistinguishable from the systems which we least admire.

There are the reasons why the injustice of this case reminded me of the injustice suffered by Lindy Chamberlain.  They are also why so many aspects of this case revolt me as a lawyer – and as an Australian.

19 Cuckoos

Orson Welles taught us that one thing that the Swiss have given us is the cuckoo clock.  Well, that is an improvement on Sep Blatter.

One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest was a protest book published in a time and place preoccupied with protest and drugs, the US in the early 1960s.  The old rhyme was:

One flew east

And one flew west

And one flew over the cuckoo’s nest.

Cuckoos lay their eggs in the nests of other birds.  They leave one egg in each nest.  The newly hatched cuckoo therefore feels free to throw out the others.  This is the dark side of Darwin’s natural selection.  Is there something Swiss about that?  Should we be above that?  This case makes you wonder.

Supporters of Melbourne Storm in the NRL know something of these things.  They know what arrant snobbery is about.  They know what it is to support a well-managed team that has a nut in the administration that breaks the rules in a crazy way.  They know what it is to see the mighty use their power to stifle inquiry and litigation. They know what it is to then see innocent players and supporters punched heartlessly in the head by power-crazed and vindictive administrators.  And, finally, they wonder if anything good ever comes out of Sydney.

As my old mate Dicky said, you learn from experience.

The best part of the Kesey book is the dedication.  Ken Kesey dedicated the book to someone ‘who told me dragons did not exist, and then led me to their lairs’.

Long may the Swiss continue to make cuckoo clocks and give a home to FIFA – but in the name of heaven, let them leave our poor, bloody footballers alone.

Bridge of Spies

 

In a Wizard of Id cartoon, that used to hang outside my chambers, a thrusting lawyer named Pettifogger demands a change of venue for the trial – he says his client cannot get a fair trial in this town.  The King glares at him and then announces that he will take the trial to another town – ‘but we are coming back here for the hanging.’  This is prejudice in a very pure sense – the case has been decided; the accused is guilty; the trial is a sham.  What you have therefore is a definitive case of prejudice in the sense of pre-judgment.

You see this in Bridge of Spies.  The Attorney played by Tom Hanks is representing a Russian spy – we know he is a spy – played by Mark Rylance.  (The spy was English born.)  The trial part takes about the first half of the film.  (I did not recognise Alan Alda as the senior partner.)  The second part deals with a prisoner swap in Berlin.  Across each is the story of the U2 Pilot Gary Powers.  It is directed by Spielberg and the Coen brothers were involved in the writing.  There is some dry black humour, but the bad guys are constant – the CIA.

This is a very American movie – Hollywood – with a mom and apple pie ending, but it is a bloody good film.  (We get the movies late up here.)  It is a great story.  It is told by masters of their craft.  And in the two leads, you have two actors from very different traditions, but two champions at the height of their powers.  There are moments of theatre involving these two great actors where you are on the edge of your seat as if you were watching a pas de deux or a duet.  They are as different in their acting styles as their characters are different in the flesh.  There is some serious male bonding that might have got both mawkish and unreal, but it got to me – just because of the star power.

Let me give some examples of the quality of the theatre.  We first see Hanks negotiating with a colleague.  I have worked with American attorneys and the good ones are as smooth as a baby’s bottom.  (The same goes for the Poms.)  Hanks is an American attorney.  A driver has lost control of a car and then run into five people.  Is that one accident or five?  (There is a cap on the cover for any one accident.)  It depends on how you look at it.  For the driver, there is one accident with five hurt.  For each of the five, there is one separate accident, making five in all.  What is the answer if the five had been in one vehicle?  Is this an example of Einstein’s theory of relativity?  So, we get to see Hanks in action, and the Socratic method.  And the same conundrum comes back in Berlin.  What is the difference between a one for one swap and a one for two?  This is great theatre.

The spy gets messages in a false coin.  Powers has a lethal spike he must used if captured in a false coin.

Hanks has a cracker of a speech before the U S Supreme Court telling them they must not give up their values for the cold war.  This was the Dark Age of McCarthy.  And when the spy asks his lawyer why he never asked if he was a spy he gets the standard answer.  The lawyer is not God.  He is just there to see that the accused has his rights observed and gets a fair hearing.  He doesn’t, but he lives.

This film is seriously entertaining, and it is hard to pay a movie a higher compliment.

And Amy Ryan is drop-dead gorgeous as the wife.  A sex symbol of a middle aged housewife in the 50’s.  You get a box of Jaffas if you can get more Freudian than that.

I salute Toby Price!

 

I watch the Dakar Rally every year.  It may even be a clean sport – something I am coming back to about Essendon.

It began as a rally from Paris to Dakar but swapped to South America about ten years ago.  The scenery is stunning – more stunning than on the Tour.  But what is required of the drivers of cars or riders of bikes tests belief.  You might have to do more than 500 k’s in a day off road in the High Andes or on the Atacama Desert and where you have to repair your own vehicle between stops and where the navigation challenge is such that people get lost.  People had to retire this year from heat (47 degrees) or altitude sickness.  It takes experience, skill, patience, endurance, courage and luck.  You just have to be tough.  It is by far the most daunting sport I have ever watched – and I think some actually take part in it as a sport.  It is far and away my best TV event.  It is much, much more testing than the WRC rallies

I remember doing a note a year or two ago about an Australian guy’s skill and courage.  He survived a fall in which he broke his neck.  I recall he had to make a big call about chancing his luck on getting a flight home to get the right surgeon.  There are two differences from the cars.  There is no protective shell, and you have to do your own navigating.  If you hit the wrong brinnie at 150ks, that might be it.

Well, the surgery worked, and this morning our timeToby Price became the first Australian winner of the Dakar.  It is a mighty, mighty achievement.  If I had to compare it, which I should not, I would think it was at least worth a Major or Grand Slam.

Well, Toby, you may not get the reception that our Michelle got – and bloody well deserved – but you are a true bloody hero.  And God knows we could use one!  Tina Turner was wrong.

More on the Bombers and Lindy shortly.  It is a lot worse than I had thought, and the prevailing ignorance and spleen is revolting.

The haughty arrogance of lawyers

 

The CAS Panel that dealt with Essendon has the same problem as Dyson Heydon, QC.  They don’t know what they are talking about.  Heydon has probably never met a trade unionist in his life, and it shows.  The members of the CAS Panel know little or nothing about the life and work of Australian footballers – two of them are not even Australian – and it shows.

Heydon had to make judgements about trade unionists and he was obviously not the man for that job.  The CAS Panel had to make judgements about Australian footballers and the members of that panel were obviously not up to that job.  Heydon displayed his rare personal flair for getting it wrong throughout the hearing and then, in his final decision, when he said: ‘It is clear (in unions) there is room for louts, thugs, bullies, thieves, perjurers, those who threaten violence, errant fiduciaries and organisers of boycotts.’ Charlie Chaplin would not have dared to take on Colonel Blimp with that kind of script.

The CAS Panel displayed its ineptitude in its decision by forgetting, as did Heydon, the first rule of judicial determination.  The most important person in the room is the loser.  Both Heydon and the panel went out of their way to convince their losers that they were hardly done by.  They have convinced me, too, and very many Australians.

Both findings may be tested in court.  Will anyone go to jail because of what Heydon said?  Experience suggests that the answer is no.  The players will sue Essendon – talk about ‘errant fiduciaries’!  Essendon will then be able to argue in its defence that the players were at fault in the manner found by the CAS Panel.  The legal issues before that court will be different technically from those before the Panel, but an allegation of fault against the players may fall to be determined by the court. Experience suggests that Essendon may be advised that it is not forensically worthwhile to take such a defence, since it may inflame both the court and the damages.  But if such a defence is taken and pushed, experience also suggests that it would be found to be bullshit by a real court.

What kind of a jurisprudence would we have then, when an arbitration body from overseas has found people guilty of fault that merits their being out of a job for twelve months because they did not ask enough questions of their boss, but a civil court awards damages to compensate them for that loss because of the wrong done to them by their boss or the AFL or both, and there is no discount for any fault on the part of the players?

How will they explain that in Brussels or London?  And what about poor Jim Spigelman, the beleaguered Chair of the beleaguered Auntie, closing a glittering forensic career as the Token Oz?  Well, at least it was decent of the Swiss, or whoever they are, to allow us to put one up for the locals.

There are aspects of this process that should shock ordinary Australians.  These players were previously acquitted by a tribunal that contained two Australians – Victorians as a matter of fact – who had long practical experience as trial judges in the County Court, plus a barrister with considerable AFL football experience.

None of this panel has had any such experience.  The President is an English silk.  Then there is a Belgian silk.  Then there is a former Chief Justice from New South Wales.  He is presumably the only one trained and brought up in our law.  Being from New South Wales, there is every chance he is ignorant of AFL culture.  The players were acquitted by judges from Victoria who knew what they were doing.  They have now been found guilty by lawyers from overseas or interstate who cumulatively know more about Brussels sprouts than the lives and work of these footballers.  Whose judgment will the great majority of Australians prefer?

That is bad enough.  But what the Panel decision makes clear is that this finding that is now made against these players, some years after the event, has been made on an argument that was reformulated on appeal and on evidence that had not been presented in the first place.  It was also made at the instance of someone who was not there in the first proceedings.  Just how defective was the original prosecution and who is responsible for the defects?

It is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive rejection of what we have regarded as fundamental to our jurisprudence, that a person should not be exposed to double jeopardy.  The regulator fails, and fails badly?  Simple, have another go and start afresh.  Even if you may take a man’s name and livelihood.

It is both revolting and frightening, is it not?  Is it beyond the dreams even of Mr Putin?  Think of it.  You fight and beat the charge to save your name and job, and then, following Kafka, they, whoever ‘they’ are, say: ‘Never mind, Sport: that was just a trial run.  Or as kids say in alleys, ‘slips’.  We will have a new prosecutor, new evidence, new arguments, and then put you up before a new panel of judges who are good at this kind of thing.  And then when we get what we want we will rub it in by saying ‘We were right all along.’’  The question, as Lenin said, is who are ‘we’?

It is even worse because of the complexity of the proceedings.  There is an agonised discussion among these three most learned jurists of whether the case would be presented as one of ‘strands in a cable’ or ‘links in a chain’.  This discussion arises in the context of discussing the nature of the rehearing and prompts one of the Panel’s periodic descents into Latin.

Then there is the finding by this gaggle of silks that these young men were at fault for not doing more to enquire about what their employer, with all of its resources, was doing to them.  Just where do these silks get the idea that they might have the faintest notion of how ordinary Australian footballers might or should behave in the course of their employment?  Will these silks from London and Belgium be just as happy for their conduct in their profession to be assessed by a panel of Australian footballers?  Did it occur to them ever that some of these footballers may not have the same education levels or even intelligence quotient as these international highflyers who are now being touted by Australian bureaucrats as the repository of all wisdom on doping?  Did it occur to them that we may be different?  Have they ever faced a problem of doing what you’re told or losing your meal ticket?  For that matter, has any of them ever worked for a boss?

They even ordered costs against the footballers although this was a different case to what they had succeeded on before, and to show how quaint and ridiculous the whole process is, they ordered the footballers to pay Swiss Fr.30,000 towards the costs of a body that had not been involved in the original proceedings.  It would not be at all surprising if the footballers thought that they had been parachuted into Alice in Wonderland.

The AFL will have to answer to these players in court for their wilful fault in allowing its footballers to be exposed to this kind of chook raffle.  The AFL is obliged to look after its footballers, which are the prime source of its business, and they have not done that by leaving them exposed to this kind of agony over three years of double jeopardy.

The players have been badly let down by vindictive, moralizing commentators, who live off the earnings of their betters, by their politicians, by their club, by the AFL, and by the bureaucrats, and now they have been even more badly let down by the lawyers.  You can imagine these footballers asking themselves what 34 lawyers would have to do to get rubbed out for twelve months.  They have been landed with a foreign-run regime not just where they are exposed to losing their livelihood for an offence of strict liability, and to double jeopardy, but where they are exposed to mandatory sentencing of the kind that some governments inflict on people of a different race.

You do have to wonder about the legality of any contract that so arrantly strips innocent people of their rights to due process.  The footballers are back were they were a century ago – feudal serfs, sans rights.  But you don’t have to wonder about the wisdom of those who signed the players up for this kind despoliation.  It looks like we have another nest of ‘errant fiduciaries’, this time at the AFL.

Fitzpatrick and McLachlan should resign.  You cannot have spent that much time on the bridge of the Titanic and just sit still.  For years, AFL heavyweights have been telling others it is time to move on.  It is time they took their own medicine.  We must see some decency somewhere.

The Australian public is now being called on to believe and accept that each of these 34 footballers has a precisely equal degree of culpability for what has happened.  That proposition is manifestly absurd.  The Australian people are also asked to believe that just because the NRL players copped only a fraction of this penalty, because they were dealt or played a better hand, does not mean that we have sold our administration of justice into the casino.  That proposition is also absurd.  The Australian people will, for the most part, think that this is just another case in our long national nightmare of those who run sport in this country having gone clean out of their minds and clean off the rails.

And let us say that some neurotic nerd does find some fault with the players – preferably a nerd who knows at least something about their work – how does that stand against the manifest failings of the politicians, administrators, bureaucrats and lawyers who have all contributed to this train-wreck that so affronts both sense and decency?  Tens and tens of millions of dollars have been spent on lawyers and ‘experts’ to work out what happened.  We are cancelling the meal tickets of ordinary footballers because three lawyers think that those footballers did not do enough to find out what was going on.  How does that grab you?  Were the poor deluded footballers looking for links in a chain when they should have gone after strands in a cable?

The journalist Chip Le Grand wrote a book about this tragic farce.  His article yesterday showed how silly it is to say the players are equally culpable.  It begins and ends as follows.

For nearly the entire Essendon drugs scandal, this has been the belief of the AFL and anti-doping authorities: a generation of Bombers players was misled by their own club into unwittingly accepting a banned peptide.

Three years after the blackest day in Australian sport, the Court of Arbitration for Sport has departed savagely from this script………

The CAS finding is consistent with the strict liability principle: an athlete is ultimately responsible for any substance that enters their body.  It is also at odds with a fundamental understanding of what happened at Essendon.

The players were not the crooks – they were the victims.  What harm did they do or what advantage did they gain over anyone else?  That is the real point of this case and the three wise men from out of town just missed it.  They got it wrong.  This often happens when you do not know what you are talking about.  In the most learned words of Professor Harry G Frankfurt of Princeton University, ‘Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about’.

Still, what would I know?    I used to dabble in arbitration, but the closed shop nature of these BYO judge and BYO law parties unsettles me.  I prefer to have to resolve issues under the general law rather than by agreement of the parties.  It is much simpler.  I have only been hearing cases part-time for thirty years.  I keep being told by counsel of the difference between the civil and criminal standard of proof, and the intermediate stage that we call Briginshaw (a case about adultery).  The people from out of town bring their own law with them.  They talk of ‘comfortable satisfaction.’  They tell us that it is a term of art.  There is something unsettling, is there not, about feeling ‘comfortable’ about sacking someone?  If they get caught with their hand in the till, yes; but just because they did not ask enough questions?

In thirty years, no one has explained our version to me.  But I recall Sir John Latham, one of our Chief Justices, saying something to the effect that common sense tells us that you need more to hang someone for murder than you do to give them a parking ticket.

I am not persuaded that the Panel applied that common sense here.  That idea went west with mystic discussion of the ‘links in the chain’ and ‘strands in a cable.’  What about some string theory or a Big Bang or two?  If guilt is so clear, why it has it been so hard and taken years to spell it out?

But I am also a parent, and if someone had done to a child of mine what the system has done to these young men, I would be even more incandescent with rage.  The injustice that we have done to these young men is the worst since we went after Lindy Chamberlain.

We as a nation have been blessed with wonderful sports men and women.  We have also been cursed with inept and arrogant administrators who always forget that we watch and admire our champions in sport, and not the hangers-on, place-seekers or time-servers, who are all now so massively overpaid.  This all comes from our embrace of mediocrity, our self-imposed immaturity, and our lingering readiness to tug our forelocks to our perceived betters.  Now we have the final outrage that we have sold out our right to judge the prime of our manhood to a bunch of foreigners who couldn’t tell a Sherrin from a Belgian waffle.

Still, in the land of Down Under, serial idiots knight dukes.

Passing Bull 26: Tolstoy, Napoleon, and flawed greatness

 

On my fourth reading of War and Peace – in the wonderful new Folio edition – I marvelled at it more than I had previously.  It is a truly great testament to humanity.  For what it is worth, I would now rate it above Ulysses and Don Quixote.  And I would do that even though the masterpiece is shot through with a rotten flaw – the nagging bullshit about Napoleon and his role in history, and some very quaint views about free will.  Still, readers of Shakespeare know that Tolstoy can make an idiot of himself, and genius is not proof against inanity.  Indeed, the rest of us might be relieved that genius can err, just as we used to feel some wonder when the Tiger duffed a shot before he hit the wall.

In his recent book Napoleon the Great, the historian Andrew Roberts said that in his opinion, as the title of the book suggests, Napoleon was great. Napoleon was certainly a man of great industry and he had what many regard as a kind of military genius. Mr Roberts does not give his criteria of greatness, but let me state briefly some of the reasons why that title might sit oddly on a man that Mr Roberts describes as ‘the Enlightenment on horseback’ – which presumably means something different to a philosophical killer or an intellectual cowboy.

As a statesman, Napoleon worked wonders in France and he left the Code named after him as his testament. But if he found Paris and France ablaze, he left them smoking ruins. It took France more than four generations to recover from Napoleon – if indeed it ever did.

His wars cost somewhere between 4 million and 5 million people killed. If you are being bayoneted or raped, you do not enquire about the motives of the person attacking you.

Napoleon lost because he had to lose. He was a compulsive gambler who kept doubling his bets. He was profligate with the lives of his French and soldiers of other nations in a way that the Duke of Wellington could never have been.

He committed the one crime that is unforgivable in a soldier in command. He deserted his own troops. He did that twice. He did it in Egypt and he did it in Russia. Each of those campaigns was commenced to satisfy his own pride and not to pursue some seriously arguable military objective. He apparently had the absurd idea that people would welcome him as their liberator or as the person bringing them the benefits of French civilisation. That idea is absurd, and it was seen to be absurd, by a leader of the French Revolution whose name is now generally reviled – Robespierre. Robespierre opposed starting the wars that were to lead into the wars that we call revolutionary. In the course of doing so, he made the following observations:

The most extravagant idea that can arise in the mind of a politician is the belief that a people need only make an armed incursion into the territory of a foreign people, to make it adopt its laws and its constitution.  No one likes armed missionaries; and the first counsel given by nature and prudence is to repel them as enemies.

We have seen the truth of those observations borne out in different theatres of Asia and the Middle East time and again in our own lifetime, but a man purporting to be a great soldier and statesman must forfeit any claim to any kind of greatness for failing to see what the terrorist Robespierre so clearly saw.

Napoleon also fails as both a general and a statesman because of his being embroiled in the two theatres where he was defeated, Spain and Russia, for no adequate military objective. The losses sustained by France in Russia, and the crimes committed against humanity in Spain and Russia, alone disqualify Napoleon from any claim to greatness.  The Russian campaign showed his double or nothing gambling instinct, and his swansong at Waterloo cost more than 40,000 men their lives or their welfare.

The failure in Russia was made worse by his inability to publish a declaration to free the serfs. This champion of French liberty was no champion of the spirits of 1789, and no such champion could ever have made himself Emperor and created his own nobility as Napoleon did.  He had become more and more hostile to the Revolution, and he had instituted a despotic police state.  He then made stupid members of his family kings in Europe.

Napoleon, therefore, might fairly be it accused of having betrayed his men, his country, and the ideals of the French Revolution. Mr Roberts may have succumbed to Romance in the form of bullshit. This is how the distinguished French historian Georges Lefebvre concluded his biography of Napoleon:

Yet the Romantics were not wholly wrong about him, for his classicism was only one of culture and cast of mind. His springs of action, his unconquerable energy of temperament, arose from the depths of his imagination. Here lay the secret of the fascination that he will exercise forevermore on the individual person. For men will always be haunted by romantic dreams of power, even if only in the passing fires and disturbances of youth; and there will thus never be wanting those who will come like Barres’ heroes to stand in ecstasy before the tomb.

Others may prefer to spend time before the tombs of some of the five million people who died so that Napoleon could pursue la gloire.

Poet of last month – Burns

Let Not Woman E’er Complain

 

Let not Woman e’er complain

Of inconstancy in love;

Let not woman e’er complain

Fickle Man is apt to rove:

Look abroad through Nature’s range,

Nature’s mighty law is change;

Ladies would it not be strange

Man should then a monster prove.

 

Mark the winds and mark the skies;

Ocean’s ebb and Ocean’s flow:

Sun and moon but set to rise;

Round and round the seasons go:

Why then ask a silly Man,

To oppose great Nature’s plan?

We’ll be constant while we can

You can be no more, you know.

 

And that, too, is on any view bullshit that conforms my views about Burns as a nativist curio.

Remembrance of Things Past – and not Past

 

As I follow it (from Prehistory by Colin Renfrew, or Professor Lord Renfrew), the current thinking of historians and scientists is that human evolution from the apes became complete about 200,000 years ago in Africa and that the main dispersal of humanity out of Africa took place about 60,000 years ago. All of us human beings are ultimately descended not from Adam and Eve but from our African ancestors in or about the area that we now call Ethiopia who were living about 200,000 years ago. They in turn had evolved over a much longer period of millions of years from the apes.

Human beings arrived in Europe and Australia about 40,000 years ago – well after they had reached the Middle East.

Any physical differences between peoples – if you must, racial or ethnic groups – follow after the dispersal from Africa. They are not genetic – they are socially or culturally induced. A child born today would be very little different in its DNA from one born, say, 60,000 years ago.  There is no reason why they could not do as well as our kids with the same upbringing.

The two big events in moving away from the Stone Age were the development of agriculture and the formation of towns. These in turn led to gods, writing, and laws. They also led to inequality. Religions tended to sanctify central power – the pharaoh, emperor or king had a divinely ordered status. Historians think that they can now trace phases of the development of the mind that ultimately became human over millions of years. Those phases bear some resemblance to the phases of legal development that our ancestors went through that were identified by Sir Henry Maine in his book Ancient Law.

Lord Renfrew makes a comment that does not surprise us.  ‘The key to inequality lies in worldly goods…..the adoption of a money economy marked the end of prehistory in so many parts of the world that we could take it as the best indicator of the dawn of history.’

Some landmarks may help with scale.  Our predecessors used a form of hand-axe before they had become what we would call human. The first jewellery and decoration appears to come from South Africa about 75,000 years ago. There are bone flutes and drawings of lions in France that are about 32,000 years old. Some of our Aboriginal rock art is at least 28,000 years old. There is a sculpted stone in Turkey that is about 11,000 years old. There are traces of permanent settlement around Jericho going back to about 9000 BC – we trace what we call the ‘agricultural revolution’ to that period. The idea that gold had some value emerged in Bulgaria around 4500 BC. Stonehenge was created between 3000 and 2000 BC and represents about 30 million work hours. Moses was born about 1400 BC. Coins were first introduced in Turkey after 1000 BC.

What we see as civilisation started in Athens in the fifth century BC. It took us more than 2000 years after that to establish that the earth was not the centre of the universe.  A lot of people who believed in Aristotle or God were horrified – much as they would later be horrified by Darwin.

If the Genesis account were applied to our creation, the earth was created not millions of years ago, but about 6000 years ago, and mankind was created, full-blown, at the same time. Science has proved that to be impossible.

If this account is correct, all human beings come from the one common stock, and any differences that some may wish to characterise as ethnic or racial are not genetic. They have come about because people have lived different lives. My humanity is the same as the humanity of the blackfella. Any differences between us come only from the way in which our ancestors have lived.

I find that view to be immensely comforting. It puts a big dent in the views of those who want to say that people are intrinsically different. At least genetically, all humans are born equal.

All this makes it hard for us humans to be sanely racist. It makes it hard for God, too.

In the last century and a half or so, we have made big discoveries in the way that we see ourselves and the universe. I regard all those discoveries as being neutral on the question of whether God exists.  God is no more or less of a mystery to me than the Big Bang, or our evolution from the apes over millions of years, or a universe that goes for millions of light years.  We can put all those terms into grammatically correct and apparently logically sound sentences, but in the end we have no real idea what is entailed by these ungovernable notions.

But the discoveries and proofs of mankind are not neutral on the history of any such God that we may choose to believe in. We now know that God could not have done what the Bible says that he did. And we now know that the people that the Bible says that he chose to make a covenant with did not have the history – that is, they were not the people – that the Bible says that they had; they were not the people that the Bible said they were.  They had come out of Africa, and down not from Adam and Eve, just over the hill, and not so long ago, and with a traceable ancestry.

You would not want to go to a bank and ask for money on the basis of a security whose title rested on a covenant given by a God that did not exist to a people that did not exist.  Or at least where the root of title of your documentary security seriously misrepresented the parties to the relevant covenant and was out of whack in its historical timing to the tune of 200,000 years or so.

Lord Renfrew quotes from a distinguished anthropologist who wanted to give a definition of religion that avoided any mention of the supernatural. He came up with this definition: ‘a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating concepts of a general order of existence and clothing these concepts were such an aura of flexibility that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.’ As the learned author remarks, a frivolous reader could see in this definition not so much a description of ‘religion’ as ‘of another powerful and ubiquitous presence in our society,’ that is, money.  Our movement from the apes has in truth had its ups and downs.

There is probably enough there for some people to digest without passing on the suggestion that our evolution from the apes was finally induced by climate change in the Great Rift Valley in Ethiopia.  That might be the last straw for some of our Republican brothers and sisters over the Pacific, or for readers of The Australian Spectator.

Speaking of remembering times past, I wish you a happy new year, although I am myself coming to prefer the Chinese model.

Happy Christmas to all those crooks out there

 

People at FIFA could not spell the word ethics.  They have suspended two high ranking officers for eight years for a ‘disloyal transaction’ where one paid millions to the other.  I gather that ‘disloyal’ means dishonest or a payment made in breach of trust in or breach of fiduciary duty.  That is, money from a fund was not applied properly for the purposes of the fund, but to suit the private interests of the parties.  The function of an ethics committee is to police ethical standards to protect members and the public.  Once a finding of dishonesty at that level in the hierarchy and in that amount of money is made, the only possible remedy is life bans.

The question is: can these people be trusted in their office after this finding of dishonesty against them?  The answer is obviously no.  And it obviously will not become yes after a holiday, even a long one.  This committee has misconceived its function completely.  You can tell that by the fines, which presuppose that these people have been enriching themselves mercilessly, but which for these people represent a parking ticket.

And why are not these crooks being prosecuted by the law for the dishonest use of the money of others?  Even on their hilarious version, they would get life bans here from acting as directors of public companies.

We are in no position to smirk.  There was an unhealthy difference of opinion at Westpac when the company agreed to ‘treat’ accounting procedures in a way that financially benefited directors – there was great unhappiness among shareholders.  Accounting issues in the debt of Glencore may have led to a valuation of its worth being bloated by billions of dollars.  Innocent investors may have been wiped out by misstatements.  Worrying disclosures are now being made about the extent to which spoiled egomaniacs posturing as sponsors of charity are just lining their pockets and boosting their egos while quietly burying their consciences.  Now we see the market worth of the business of law firm that went public going through the floor over arguments over the real worth of a major acquisition – although, it is a little hard to feel too sorry for investors who put such a huge valuation on the business of a law firm that made its name from acting for people who could not afford to pay lawyers.

It is worrying when accountants say they will ‘treat’ a transaction in a different way.  This is especially so if you can only change the label you apply, or the box you put a transaction into, if the facts are different.  There are problems in saying that cat is a dog, or that a transaction that we said occurred on 1 July, did in fact occur on 30 June.  If you make a false statement for material gain, you are in the territory of the crime called theft.  It is like American politicians saying that they ‘miss-spoke’: they are either lying now or they were lying before.

It is time that the law caught up with people who flirt with the truth and ruin others.  In parts of this country, we throw blackfellas into jail for the equivalent of stealing loaf of bread because it is their third offence.  We do not see people going to jail for allowing their greed to give us the Global Financial Crisis or by filling their own pockets while misleading shareholders.  I am very far from saying that such a comment applies to any of the corporate examples that I have referred to above, but it would certainly apply to the officers of FIFA, and I have no doubt many shifty corporate operators here.

Speaking as a taxpayer, I would be happy to put quite a few such crooks up at my and the public’s expense for a number of Christmases.  Such a course would be good for moral at large and help a lot of people to a happier Christmas.

Religious extremism

 

According to the Fairfax press, a firebomb attack in a village on the West Bank in July this year is thought to have been carried out by people described as ‘ nationalist far–right extremists’.  A group of people known as ‘The Revolt’ are intent on creating a Jewish kingdom.  According to Shlomo Fischer of the Jewish People Policy Institute, these people believe that they are acting on the ‘voice of God’. Their goals are to ‘create chaos and undermine the ability of the government to rule and set up a revolutionary redemptive state.  They want to replace the current State of Israel with something else – their main animosity, just like al-Qaeda directing their animosity to the non -jihadist Muslim regimes, is against the government of Israel. They are aware of the fact that they will be treated with kid gloves because they are Jewish – that has been the precedent until now.’

This far-right group sees the existence of this new state as an integral part of redemption, which is said to relate to the liberation of Jews from exile. There is another body call Hilltop Youth.  It shares these views and regards the ‘disengagement’ by the Sharon government in 2005 from the Gaza Strip as a huge blow. For them, the disengagement involved the state turning its back on the redemption process and many settlers thought that they had to work harder to continue the fight. The Hilltop Youth says that the redemption will happen even if the State of Israel is not there.

A party associated with the peace movement in the area said: ‘the settlements are based on discrimination – the fact that you raise children a place where you as an Israeli Jew have rights and Palestinians do not have rights and are instead living under military law; this raises people to believe that they are more than the others.’

The same article says that two members of this far right group of religious extremists have been arrested and subjected to detention under laws passed to deal with terrorists. One of these is a dual Australian Israeli citizen named Evyatar Slonim.  It is said that Israel holds hundreds of Palestinians in administrative detention under these laws. The parents of Slonim said that they were absolutely horrified that in a democratic country their son has been imprisoned without a trial.  Slonim’s lawyer said that Israeli intelligence authorities have taken the gloves off since the July attack.  The lawyer gets paid, according to Fairfax, by a ‘right-wing legal centre.’

These terrorists commonly use a calling card with fire-bombs thrown into homes with people in them.  The July raid killed three.  The word ‘Revenge’ appeared with the Star of David.  According to a manifesto of The Revolt, ‘burning tyres can be placed at the entrance of the house to remove the possibility of escape.’

This sort of terrorism is a mix of madness and evil, of religion and nationalism.  It is light years away from the evil of IS.  But although Israelis as a whole utterly reject this evil, they do not as a whole or as a nation utterly reject the continuing settlements.  And the problem is that those settlements draw on the same scripture as the do the terrorists.  Is it possible to have any peace in the Middle East if the settlement issue is not resolved?

People who do not have God – such as me – get sceptical, to put it softly, when people of one God take it on themselves to tell people of another God how to manage their affairs or what kind of reformation or enlightenment that they should undertake.  It gets even worse when you have a complete idiot, like Tony Abbott, boasting that his culture under his God is superior to that of others who follow a lesser God.

We might be just as sceptical about people of one God telling people of another God to keep God out of politics if we recall that God is in politics in the State of Israel up to his neck – spiritually, morally, and geographically.  And we might also recall that the promise in the Israel Declaration of Independence of ‘complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion race or sex’ holds about as much water as the promise of equality in another Declaration of Independence at the same point in its history.  Sweet Fanny Adams.

Finally, people here worry that the debate about religious extremism here is being stifled.  I have a lot of sympathy with that view.  If you seek to debate the actions of the State of Israel here, you very quickly get spoken to firmly – not by the Jewish community, but by our far right.

Religious extremism is unsettling anywhere and everywhere.  Those who have God think that some believers are not as odd as others; for the unbelievers, they are all much of a muchness.  Infighting between believers is unedifying.  I am yet to meet a person who says that their brand of God is inferior to that of others.  I am yet to meet a person who concedes that other Gods may even be equal to theirs.  I don’t think they are allowed to say anything like that.  They know that most must be wrong but say that they are the only ones who have it right.  None of them is spotless and all are forms of extremism.  .  It is enough to put you off religion full stop.

Deciding Cases

 

Reflections on some facts of forensic life for those who hear and decide cases by a lawyer who has been hearing cases for thirty years and fighting them for nearly fifty years.

1

Job description

People are in conflict and need help.  Your job is to help them by resolving the conflict.  To do so, you will have to take authority over them by making decisions that bind them by the force of the law and the power of government.  The sooner you do this, the better – for you and for them.

If any of that sounds odd or makes you queasy, you should not be in this job.  Nor can it worry you that in most cases you will have to make decisions that can hurt people badly, and affect how they live.  All that comes with the job, and if you don’t like it, don’t hang on to the job.  (If you positively enjoy that part of the job, you may have a worse problem at the other end.)

It is not your job: to preen yourself or to ,to bung on side; to save your face or to seek to save your job; to seek to immunise yourself from review or appeal; to worry about either – at least if the worrying affects your ability to do your job; to seek to leave a legacy, or to build a monument to juristic science or literary grace; to boost your promotion prospects; to decline to carry your weight as a member of the team, by, say pleading the pressure of work in reserved judgments, or by knocking off early to play golf or pick up the kids from school; to grizzle about your workload or the miserliness of government – people are sick of all that buck-passing in politicians; to insist on doing one job, such as mediation, when you have been appointed to do another; to flaunt your power or to show your unease at its extent; to get snooty with those lower on the hierarchy or to get prickly with those who are higher; to mask any actual or felt shortcomings with pomp or ceremony or literary affectation; to be rude or overbearing; to fail to hold in check the prejudices that all flesh is heir to; to come to a decision based on your personal needs or wishes, or before giving a fair hearing to each side; to close your mind to further inquiry too soon, or, perhaps, at all; to forget that in our adversary system, the running should be left in the main to the parties and their lawyers – you are not an MC at a wedding, and you should intervene sparingly and reluctantly, and generally forebear from attempting wit (a besetting vice of mine); to forget that you are a servant of the people and not their master – even if your job gives you authority over some of them now and then; or to forget the wisdom of the maxim that the most important person in the courtroom is the loser.

Generally speaking, at least one party has to lose, and it is the judgment of this party on your handling of the case that you should look to – the winner commonly thinks that you are the greatest thing since King Solomon, ‘a second Daniel,’ as Rumpole exultantly intoned when the Old Bull got one right one day.

2

Qualifications

You should have the sense of vocation, learning, training, and hard experience with the law and people and the courts in action that will qualify you to do this job.

Hopefully, the sense of vocation is what got you into the law in the first place, and has not been entirely dimmed by the ups and downs of practice, the many bad falls and hits on the way, or by the tribute exacted by the tax man or the bank manager while you try to keep them in place while you put food on your table.

After you have learned the alphabet at university, how do you go about getting the training and hard experience to practise it at the bar or the bench?  On the job.  In any profession – perhaps in any human undertaking – teaching and book learning can only take you so far.  The know-how that is applied in, say, cross-examining a witness, or deciding whether to cross-examine or to call a witness at all, only comes with practice, which here equals experience.  Say fifteen to twenty years.

In the course of that time, you will have watched judges do your job, and you will have learned from them.  You will learn from the whole range of them – from those who are so sure and safe that you could never hope to emulate them, to those who are so awful that you are determined to free the world of their like.  In the course of your practice, you not only learn the hard way about fighting cases – you learn the techniques of hearing and deciding them, and with luck, you get to learn from the best, as well as the worst.  You would certainly lack finish if you had only run into one kind and not all kinds.

There are two important strands to the education in the judicial college known as the bar.  One is the sense that all litigation is a form of lottery – you can never know what might happen.  Over time lawyers get a sense of the ‘merits’ of the case, but there is no guarantee that that sense will be shared by the judge or jury or the script-writer that we call Providence.  The other is that if you start at the bottom and work up, you will be exposed to our community in all its colour, and layers, and you will have learned how to talk to all kinds of people and to try to break down the sense of mystery at one end and distrust at the other.

You will simply be unable to do any of this if you come from a more precious or sheltered background.  You may not even know how silly it is to ask a former judge who has never been a trial judge to conduct a judicial inquiry into the affairs of trade unions when his Honour may not have met one trade unionist in his whole life.  You may as well ask the President of the ACTU to compile a dossier on etiquette for the Melbourne Club.

What I am saying is I think reflected in what Churchill said about a P M who never fought an election, the Earl of Roseberry.

Whatever one may think about democratic government, it is just as well to have practical experience of its rough and slatternly foundations.  No part of the education of a politician is more indispensable than the fighting of elections.  Here you come in contact with all sorts of persons and every current of national life.  You feel the Constitution at work in its primary processes.  Dignity may suffer, the superfine gloss is soon worn away; nice particularisms and special private policies are scraped off; much has to be accepted with a shrug, a sigh or a smile; but any rate in the end one knows a good deal about what happens and why.

You can tell judges who have not been roughed up enough.  They are out of their depth or all at sea, depending on your maritime preferences.  Bad judges have narrow minds, often because they have not lived enough outside their own world.  You can see it on the faces of some of them, or hear it when they open their mouth.  Or when they look down on you as they bow.

3

The nature of the court

Being a judge is different to being a legislator (although at some levels a ruling or decision may have a similar effect), or conducting a government inquiry, like a Royal Commission.

Our system is not inquisitorial.  It is adversarial.  Subject to questions about who bears the onus of proof, and what the standard of proof is, the judges listen to the evidence and the arguments and rule in favour of the case they prefer.  They are not generally purporting to record what happened as a matter of historical fact, but which side’s case seems more likely.  On questions of fact in a civil case, anything better than 50/50 is enough.  In the early ‘70’s, a magistrate named Bob Maloney when hearing crash and bash cases – motor car accidents –would at the conclusion of the evidence look at one counsel and say ‘on balance, I think his version might be just a bit more probable than yours – can you work out the appropriate orders?’  I wondered then, and now, whether any reasoning that was more evolved would be any more than window-dressing.

The legal historian, F W Maitland, put it this way:

The behaviour which is expected of a judge in different ages and by different systems of law seems to fluctuate between two poles.  At one of these, the model is the conduct of the man of science who is making researches in his laboratory and will use all appropriate methods for the solution of problems and the discovery of truth.  At the other stands the umpire of our English games, who is there, not in order that he may invent tests for the powers of the two sides, but simply to see that the rules of the game are observed.  It is towards the second of these ideals that our English medieval procedure is strongly inclined.  We are often reminded of the cricket match.  The judges sit in court, not in order that they may discover the truth, but in order that they may answer the question ‘How’s that?’…..But even in a criminal cause, even when the King is prosecuting, the English judge will, if he can, play the umpire rather than the inquisitor’.

Nor need you be put off by the fact that Maitland was talking of the Middle Ages – the 14th century in fact – because the model still holds good.

It follows that an active participant in the fight at the bar has to make a transition to a passive participant watching the action from the bench.  This transition does not look as simple as it did two generations ago.  You do not see the same readiness to suppress the ego, and just watch the system take its course, but you do see judges now being more ready to lay down the law and impose their will than used to be the case.  Somehow the unwritten fall-back that less is better got left behind, and we can now see some wunderkind bent on arriving at their chosen peak with a quite unembarrassed show of ambition.  We see silks becoming human rights lawyers and judges trailing ideological capes with a view to promotion.  These generalisations are of course large, but life at the bar is now a lot more commercial and driven than it was fifty years ago, and the difference is washing over on to the bench.

4

Our reputation for being slow

When Hamlet was thinking of suicide, one problem of the world that crossed his mind was ‘the law’s delay.’  (Others included ‘the proud man’s contumely’ and ‘the insolence of office’.)  The law rarely shakes off its reputation for being too slow.  The faster you go, the more likely you are to get it wrong – but you can say the same about being slow.  If a case takes too long, there are too many ways in which a fair trial may be imperilled – and it is not often the party with the merits but without the means that wants or causes delay.  Delay tends to suit the wealthy.

Delay in litigation may come about in at least three ways.  There may be a delay between the start of the action and its hearing, either because there are not enough judges and the waiting list is too long, or because the court or the parties want to talk about process before getting down to substance – the trial.

Another source of delay is the hearing itself.  A simple crash and bash, one on one, would take under an hour when I started doing them.  A simple maintenance case, wife against husband, would take about the same.  But the impression that you get now is that a commercial or defamation case that fifty years ago would have taken two or three days, may now take two or three weeks.

The third kind of delay comes about because some judges do not feel able to give a decision on the spot.  They wish to take time to reflect and to prepare a written decision.  This can take days, weeks, months or longer, and drive people to despair   (I heard a difficult tax case that involved accounting issues, legal issues, and hand-to-hand lying.  It went on appeal to a single judge of the Supreme Court who had to conduct his own hearing.  The family of the principal rang me from time to time asking when the judge would opine.  He kept them waiting for two years.  It was very cruel.  Among other things, there were issues of credit.  In that time, the principal died, and the High Court changed the law, and the presumption of a fair trial had gone clean out the window.)

By and large, the judges can deal with the first cause of delay in getting the case on.  They might say that the government is not paying enough judges, but the public does not accept that slipperiness.  They have hardly begun to try to control the length of the hearing, and there are wild variations in the time taken to deliver judgment – and too great an unreadiness to give one on the spot.

Possibly the most famous clause of the Great Charter of liberties given 800 years ago says, in English translation, ‘To none will we sell, to none will we deny or delay right or justice.’  People know the meaning of the phrase that justice delayed is justice denied.  Not many people believe that the great promise of Magna Carta has been kept.  People going to court do not want to add their wealth or their bones to some glorious juristic edifice – they just want to be put out of their misery and to get on with their lives.

5

Getting the case on

Let us look at the first area of delay – the time between the start of the action, by say the issuing and serving of a writ, and the start of the hearing or trial.

When I started fighting cases in 1971, mostly before Magistrates or even Justices of the Peace, most criminal cases were like most civil cases.  You got the charge sheet or the summons, or the complaint for a motor car accident case or maintenance, that told you next to nothing – except where and when you were to turn up to fight it.  There was nothing remotely like pleadings on either side, and no mention before or direction from the court.  You knew what the informant or complainant wanted, and you turned up at 9.30 to get your customer’s version, and then sit around praying that you would not sit there all day, and have to drive back into town from, say Frankston, after 4 pm, without one cent of the promised $20 brief fee in your pocket, and complaining, even more loudly than the punter, about the ineptness of your colleagues whose unconstrained dilatoriness had stopped you getting on.  You may even have wondered why the courts do not watch counsel more closely and do more to ensure that cases were dealt with quickly and sensibly.  Both you and the parties are bemused by the other-worldly sense that time has stood still.  There is nothing like a shut-out to prompt anxious reflection about forensic efficiency.

In the tribunals I have run over the last thirty years, I have, after getting rid of the back-list, and after giving the cowboys a chance to look at the new sheriff, sought to follow that old Magistrates’ Court model.  I have described the procedure of my tax tribunal that ran for eighteen years as follows:

There are none of the trappings of civil procedure in a court.  I dispensed with directions hearings.  The parties were assured that the Tribunal would try to get rid of every matter referred to within six weeks.  We usually did.  Generally when a matter was referred, it was given a hearing date about four weeks away.  The hearing was generally concluded in the morning and the parties got a decision that day or the next.  Doubtless the Commercial Lists of the superior Court are dealing with much more sophisticated matters that have to take a much longer time, but I have the clearest view that if people want a fight, the best thing for us to do is provide an arena with a referee, and let the best team win.  Witness statements were out; adjournments were never in.  We should not tell them how to run a case, but we can put firm time limits on.  We frequently dealt with cases in a morning which I had been assured would take days.  After a while, I learned not to allow a case to go beyond lunch.  Never give a barrister a second chance.

I have had a lot of trouble implementing the same ‘half-day all-over in six weeks’ regime in a disciplinary tribunal, because it seems to attract lawyers with different notions of relevance and no regard at all for time, and both sides appearing to have a lot of money behind them.  On one occasion, I asked the kind of procedural question that police prosecutors deal with routinely; counsel said they needed to get instructions; they then said they need a short adjournment; six lawyers then left the room; in a case that could and should have been dealt with as a plea in twenty minutes.  The erosion of public money was frightening.

There were difficulties in the summary form of process in the tax tribunal because commonly the real issue only became clear during the hearing.  There had been an assessment, an objection, and a decision on that objection.  Regrettably, both sides tended to load up the barrel with anodyne catch-alls, and I would occasionally ask Counsel for the Crown whether in the course of their argument they might make some passing reference to the terms of the decision that they had been briefed to defend – if only for auld lang syne. 

But this is very common, is it not, even in courts of pleadings?  And although we liked to get through cases in half a day, after we lost those massive cases about petrol and tobacco ‘taxes’ when the High Court rubbed them out, there was hardly any case that did not involve tricky issues of law and fact.  The Crown appealed as of right and almost as of course if it lost before me.  It usually appealed if it lost before a single judge, when the case went to the Full Court or the Court of Appeal.  Three cases made it to the High Court.  For the trivia night, each of the two most recent appointees to the High Court appeared before my tax tribunal on their own, before taking silk, as counsel for the successful taxpayer – and one of those cases went to the High Court.

In any event, I commend the in-and-out-in-six-weeks model to others.  I have had a lot of complaints and rolled eyeballs and a few writs from lawyers, but I cannot recall any complaints from the punters – at least those who had a reasonable case.

6

Court control or management

Fifty years ago, there were basically two models for civil litigation.  There was the one I have just described where young barristers got instruction in the facts of life, and not just forensic life, by doing police offences and minor crime, crash and bash, matrimonial and fencing and building (‘work and labour done’) cases; consumer law had not been heard of and people turned their noses up at debt collecting – we still had legislation for the imprisonment of fraudulent debtors.  Both civil and criminal cases were dealt with summarily – and that was not a pejorative term.

The other model was the one that we inherited from the English.  The parties seek to define the issues they want the court to decide by exchanging what are called pleadings.  They then seek to find out (to discover) what documents each has that may bear on the dispute.  They could then serve written questions called interrogatories on the other side that had to be answered on oath.  Then when they had done all that, which might take a year or two, they would sign a document saying that they were ready to go.  They would be put in a list of cases ready for hearing, and after say six months they would get a date when they would turn up and hope to get a judge who could give them a start – after grilling them about why they hadn’t settled.  If there were any procedural issues on the way – about pleadings, discovery, or interrogation – the party aggrieved would raise this with an officer of the court and get a ruling.  These rulings were expensive – as was everything else.

The disadvantages of the system that did not operate summarily are obvious.  It has delay written all over it.  There was a vast amount of case law and learning, and lore, about pleadings and discovery – far, far more law than we have for the law of negligence or contract.  And it was as arcane as it was large – a precious tool was a 1948 English text called the White Book.  The learning about specially endorsed writs and summary judgment was notoriously abstruse – and utterly without consequence for the punters.  Young barristers would get out of the summary cases to do these applications, and the associated paper work, for, say, the second five year period of their apprenticeship, and with some trials in the County Court, this work would get them ready for the big stage.  As an educational process for the bar, this was all terrific – but like all our process and all our case law, it was built on the bones of dead litigants, and so much of it had the foetid air described by Charles Dickens.

So, a little more than thirty years ago, the judges started to take from the parties the role of bringing problems to the attention of the court, and began to assume responsibility for managing the business in their own list or docket by giving directions for each step up to the listing for trial.  This model is now much used.  It stops cases going into oblivion, which is not always a good thing, but it does look to have been a bonanza for the lawyers.  They have a lot more work to do.  The focus on managing the preparation of the case for hearing has not been matched by an increase in the control of the process in the hearing itself.  So far as I know, we do not keep records of the average times of waiting to get on or of the duration of the hearing itself, but experience does not support the view that building up documentation will shorten the hearing – the contrary is the case.

The idea that the judge, rather than the parties, dictates the terms of process, suggests a movement from the adversarial to the inquisitorial model.  If you use the word ‘dossier’ for ‘docket’, you can follow the change.  It is still the parties that put in what goes into the docket, but they are doing so in response to a direction from the judge.  As a result, the judges spend a lot more time down in the arena than they used to.

People have different views on this – I think it is unfortunate.  There is something to be said for the old view that good judges are like good children – they should be seen and not heard – and if judges are now responsible for managing their load to at least try to honour Magna Carta, they will have to accept responsibility for when the system goes off the rails – which it often does.

7

Stating the case

Pleadings were not used in the old days in the two lower courts – the person starting might put something like a pleading in the starting document, and the defendant would be called on to state their defence orally at the start.  Even in the Supreme Court, simple cases, say for goods sold and delivered, could be started with a formulaic common count.

The system of pleadings used in the Supreme Court, and the federal courts hearing civil actions, derived from the English.  Their history goes back to the medieval Year Books when what we know as the common law started with arguments about the nature of the claims that might be asserted in different kinds of writ.  The system was developed to enable juries to give a yes or no answer to the issue that arose or to allow the court to rule as a matter of law on the adequacy of an allegation or response.

They developed into a subtle art form that too few could master.  That subtlety was used in some areas, most notably libel, for poorer litigants to get beaten up with.  Requests for more detail could be ludicrously oppressive.  Too many games were played for too little result.

As we apply the system, it has been flawed by at least one error.  You are to state the material facts – ‘he hit me’, ‘he promised to paint the timber and the brick’, or ‘he told my boss I was a thief.’  But then the system allowed for a second category of allegation.  When you went into detail, this kind of allegation was called ‘particulars’.  Sadly, the way the system grew up, it was only then that the other side knew what they had to deal with.  But the rules said that you do not plead to particulars.  So the parties wind up like tourists in taxis going round and round in circles on the Place de la Concorde, or like passengers in a taxi in New York where you and the driver are seeing the city for the first time..

Another problem was that you were supposed to be frank in responding – ‘I did not borrow $10, but I did borrow $5’; ‘I did not say he was a thief, but I did say that the Police suspected him of it’ became ‘I did not borrow $10, or any other amount’ and ‘I did not say he was a thief or make any other statement to a similar effect.’

Then came the glitzy supercharged models with preposterous definitions in bold and the scattergun that is the last resort of the timid or the desperate, and the system could go clean of the rails.  I will look later at a truly pathological example, and at the highest level, of how we can get pleadings so wrong.

For myself, I wold like to see someone trial a system where each side sets out every allegation that it relies on to claim the orders it says the court should make, and we will see you there on the day – and if you choose to make life hard for either us or them, it might go badly for you.  Each side should set out its version of events, and the legal consequences.  That is how the argument will end, and there is something to be said for starting it that way.

Some people like to get someone on oath at the start.  Corporations or the like put up people who will not be called, but I have misgivings about imperilling immortal souls on what might be little more than moves in chess.  If someone says ‘this is my story’, and then changes their story, they should have to live with what usually follows in other contexts – the possible collapse of their credit and their case.  One of the failures of the current regime is that it is so technical, lawyerly, and contrived that most trimmers get away with it too easily.

Immanuel Kant was a great figure in the Enlightenment and he had a mind of prodigious output.  His Critique of Pure Reason might be the most dense and abstruse book ever written.  Years after it had been published, Kant confessed to his students that at first he had no idea of the goal of the Critique.  He told his students that anyone who thinks methodically ‘must know (1) what precisely it is that he wants to establish, and (2) what is decisive for establishing it.’  Before you can give an answer, you have to find the question.

8

Getting the evidence together

There are some cases where a party would like to know what documents the other side had.  Well, on a straight common law action, a hang-over from trial by battle, it would have been silly to suggest you might take a look at what the other side had beforehand.  Documentation was fundamental in disputes over land and often critical in commercial disputes, but the parties were left to procure their evidence as best they could – knowing that they could rely on subpoenas at the trial.

But the Chancery, which operated on the conscience of parties, could and often did order parties to produce documents.  They could also deliver written questions called interrogatories.  Both had to be answered on oath – the Chancery used to proceed on the basis of testimony sworn in writing (affidavits).  When in the reform movement in the 19th century, the English sought to streamline legal process by fusing the Chancery with common law courts, the new combined court could invoke the equitable processes of discovery and interrogation in common law actions – say negligence or contract – and that came to be the practice as a matter of course in superior courts.   By an accidental process of history, the common law action had acquired an inquisitorial overlay.

Here are some of the problems you will face in handling this ancient equitable remedy.  It is what surgeons call an invasive procedure, and the patients do not like it at all.  They will try to avoid it, and you have to rely on a kind of honour system.  It puts lawyers in a dreadful position: they have to tell their client to come clean even if it means that they lose the case.  But what if they are the firm’s best client and they threaten to go elsewhere; and the lawyer would rather not lose the partnership while there are three daughters at Wesley?  The judges extended the ambit of search beyond those directly material documents to those that might lead to a train of inquiry.  What a boon for bush lawyers.  An off the cuff remark by a judge in Victorian England, in a case about birdshit in Peru, has done wonders for retailers of Mercedes and BMW in Australia.  Big corporations and big firms could do snow jobs.  The process has been an immensely rewarding chocolate factory for lawyers since a time about thirty years ago when someone said they could charge a dollar a page, and Mr Xerox became the managing partner.  It is hard to catch the cheats, and when one rotten party got rubbed out for cheating, it persuaded a naïve appellate court to put it back in the game.  Finally, people are forever hanging themselves by email – that is just how Bill Gates came unstuck – and the stakes just get bigger in every way.

There is no doubt that some meritorious cases are aided by discovery.  Are they worth the frightful problems and costs?  Opinions will differ, but well off parties may be better placed to deal with those problems than others.  I have certainly not missed it in thirty years on the tribunal – although my theoretical access to all the files of the revenue officers meant I had a fall-back if I thought that games were being played by the Crown.  (It of course has its own powers.)

In my view, there should not be discovery as of right or course.  Depending on your view about judicial intervention before hearing, you could have a rule like one common in arbitration that each party produce each document that it will rely on at the hearing and stipulate what documents it requires from the other, or you could leave it to the court to develop different schedules for different sorts of litigation.

9

Presenting the evidence

Historically, evidence in common law and criminal cases was given in the witness box, and in cases in equity it was sworn to in writing.  When court management came into vogue about thirty years ago, many judges thought that they could speed up the hearing by having the evidence of a witness reduced to writing and adopted on oath in the witness box, so that you could scrap evidence in chief.  I don’t think many now believe that this innovation saved court time.  It certainly put costs through the roof.

This device is thankfully being phased out.  It is impossible to remove the fear that evidence is being concocted by the witness and the lawyers, and it is not fair to the witness to throw them straight into the deep end of a shark pool.  Evidence is either contentious or not – if not, it can be led; if it is contentious, it should never be led.

In the 1970’s to the 1980’s, the late Neil McPhee and I fought a lot of contempt cases.  We lost every one.  We used to put the journo on affidavit and drop it on the Crown on the day – this was after all a kind of criminal prosecution.  Can you imagine the care that was put into these documents?  As we crossed William Street one day, the following type of conversation occurred.

I don’t like this, Neil.  That bloody affidavit has more holes in it than a bridal veil.

The judge only knows what’s in the affidavit.  Your problem, my friend, is that you were involved in preparing the document.  You know too much.

Is that better or worse than the contrary, Neil?

Within about twenty minutes of the start, the judge and the Solicitor-General were having a whale of a time picking out the most telling holes.  Neil was a lot better at keeping a straight face than me – he was of course the senior counsel.  Putting it at its lowest, it is appallingly unbecoming for lawyers to put themselves in this position.  Those who defend this dreadful sham cannot have spent much time at the composing or concocting end – or seen or heard some of the wilder unsworn statements in criminal cases.

It is not fair to the witness; it is not fair to the lawyers: and it is not fair to the judge.  They want to assess the witnesses by hearing them give their evidence from the start.  I have described elsewhere how sickening the other process can be.

The last case I heard at VCAT showed what happens when inanity prevails.  A Sicilian migrant went from being a butcher to a baker – he did not like the cool room – and he astutely bought land in the corridor.  By the time he got to me, he was worth north of $40 million.  He distrusted lawyers and all professionals.  Was he now a farmer?  Someone had made directions for witness statements, which are anathema to me, and all the ghastly folderol indulged in by lazy judges.  The Sicilian filed a [long] statement in impeccable English about trusts and companies.  The first thing he did in the witness box was to ask for an interpreter!  But he knew his occupation:  FARMER.  Since I thought that that answer begged the question, I asked the interpreter what was the Italian word for ‘farmer’ and he said there was none.

That case had become unfair for all involved, including me as the tribunal, because it had become a circus.

Before leaving evidence I should say something about the oath.  It comes from a very different religious age.  I like to swear in witnesses myself to get a look at them from the start.  It is hard to believe that many witnesses take the oath seriously.  They just blithely go through a formality.  It is one thing to have the supernatural in court; it is another thing to countenance hypocrisy in court.  I think we should look at something like a statutory declaration where the witness is told point blank about perjury.  I could not care less about their relations with the Almighty in this world or the next, but I want them to know that if they play up and get caught, they are looking at the slammer.  That can sound late and heavy-handed coming from the bench.  Such a course might also avoid the appearance that we prefer one faith over others.

While we are scrapping witness statements, let’s also ditch court books, written submissions, and folders of authorities.  If people want to submit a note of their argument, in the form say of one and a half pages in summary and syllogistic form, fine – but nothing more ornate.  Counsel refer to far too many cases – and too often when they are committing the mortal sin of not knowing what the case actually decided.  (Every now and then, ask counsel who won the case they are referring to.)  If as counsel you want to hand up a report of case, and you can tell the court what the case decided, just hand up the headnote and the part you rely on.  I heard lots of charities cases, and one part of the law was stated with Biblical finality in one paragraph by a Law Lord in the 19th century.  I always got the full case, about 100 pages, and had to resist reading some drole observations by Lord Macnaghten on the lifestyles of the Moravians.

Some of these steps may have some benefit for the court, but not enough to make the punters pay for it.  I personally would say the same about transcript – apart from one well publicised public inquiry, I don’t think I ever saw one before I gave a decision in all my time – but that may I think be a bridge too far for generations brought up in far, far more comfort than their ancestors ever knew.

I would also scrap mandatory mediation.  There is something on the nose about the courts’ forcing people to try to be reasonable and to agree, but only after the lawyers have had a few more trips to the well, and then in a very expensive and courtly way.  Court ordered mediation is too prone to being just another rung on an already expensive ladder, and one that too many lawyers stand and posture on.  The process has now been saddled with a bureaucracy that is Orwellian if not insane.  People traditionally settle when they get a sight of bare steel, so that the best way to get them to think seriously of settlement as soon as possible is to get them into the ring as soon as you can.  That, in the words of Doctor Johnson, will concentrate their minds wonderfully.  Setting up a dress rehearsal first is a way for wannabes to line their pockets.

10

Procedure run amok – court management gone berserk

Before I come to the hearing, and later phases, I want to take some time to describe a forensic trainwreck that shows how badly we can get things wrong.

Australia enjoyed a long mining boom.  Central to that boom had been the need of China for our mining products.  Fortescue Metals is a publicly listed company engaged in mining.  It and its Chairman and CEO, ‘Twiggy’ Forrest, are on any view major players.  Mr Forrest is no shrinking violet.

In August 2004, Fortescue published statements to the market claiming that it had ‘binding contracts’ with three Chinese state owned entities that supported its Pilbara Mining Project.  The importance to the market of these statements, and their effect on share price and the personal wealth of Mr Forrest will be obvious.  As will be their possible fallibility.  After investigating a claim in the press that this claim about binding contracts with the Chinese was false, ASIC, the corporate regulator, sued Fortescue and Forrest saying that the claim was misleading.  They expressly alleged that Mr Forrest had said something that he knew was untrue.  That is an allegation of dishonesty.

It is hard to imagine a case requiring greater diligence and good sense in its disposal.  Yet the issue was not decided until more than eight years after the publication, and six and a half years after the action was commenced.  By the end, the claim of the regulator extended to 108 pages.  This forest-killing exercise in gamesmanship was probably about 106 pages more than the average investor would think was required to raise a simple issue about a businessman telling a whopper.  The case is if nothing else a frightful warning of how our excessive case management leaves us unable to see the wood for the trees.  A more bleak view is that this was one of the great snow jobs in Australia’s legal history.  It is a matter that could have been dealt with by a committee of the Stock Exchange in an afternoon in response to a one page letter.

The trial judge gave judgment in December 2009.  The judgment runs to 200 pages in the law reports.  (I wrote a book The Common Law, A History.  It started with Adam and Eve and it went to 47,000 words.  This judgment would be about twice as long as that.)  The trial judge found against ASIC and for Fortescue and Forrest.  His Honour made observations about the need to be careful with allegations of dishonesty.  Well, if nothing else, this was a statement of the bleeding obvious about the need to deal with this case sensibly and swiftly, and it might look rich for one lawyer, even if a judge, to grizzle about the delays wrought by lawyers.  Yet for all the readiness of Mr Forrest to hug the limelight outside, and for all the outrage expressed by his lawyers at the awful charges against him, Mr Forrest was not prepared to go into the witness box.  He took the Fifth; then he pleaded defences on which he bore the onus.  Mr Forrest was not prepared to put his considerable mouth where his even more considerable wallet was.  The reputation of West Australian mining entrepreneurs was not on the up.

The regulator appealed to the Full Court.  That court gave judgment in February 2009.  The three judges, the Chief Justice (now on the High Court) and two very experienced commercial judges, were unanimous in finding that the relevant statement was misleading, and that Mr Forrest had been implicated.  The company and he had therefore been in some kind of limbo for nearly five years, sublime testimony to the value of the law’s delays to those who may be found to have fallen outside it but who are rich enough to play the game.

Justice Finkelstein did not agree at all with the trial judge about the conduct of ASIC.  He did what an investor would expect a judge to do, and he looked at the course of trading in shares.  You can read the remarks for yourself.  They will surprise no one who invests on the Stock Market.

But there was a last avenue of appeal, and money (except ours) had ceased to be an object years’ ago.  The High Court gave special leave to appeal, heard the appeal and gave judgment in October 2012 – eight and a half years after the publication complained of.  Judgment against ASIC and for Fortescue and Mr Forrest.  The High Court focussed on the pleadings.  Rather than look at how the lawyers were driven to characterise events, they might have spent more time looking at what investors do.

What was the upshot of this embarrassing Dickensian shambles?  One judge gives judgment for the miners and a smack to the regulator.  Three judges unanimously go the other way and try to ensure that the regulator is not frightened out of doing its job.  Then the last five unanimously go back to the start, in the sure and God-given conviction that if there had been another level of appeal on the merry-go-round, it would probably have been their turn next.

The High Court said that the issue was what readers of the statement to the stock exchange would have understood by the reference to ‘binding contract.’  That is an issue of fact.  It is a perfect example of an issue fit to be tried by a jury.  But the Federal Court does not have juries and only one of the nine judges hearing this case had ever instructed a jury.  How would people of the intellectual refinement and cloistered seclusion of these judges know how the ordinary person would react?  Why would justices of the High Court be better placed to deal with this factual issue than Federal Court judges who at least still get to try issues of fact without a jury?  When was the last time any of these judges had been in a queue for a beer and a pie at the Storm v the Eels?  And why would the High Court allow its precious resources to be spent on a simple issue of fact?

The Full Court said that the reference to ‘binding contract’ would not have been understood by the ordinary investor as a statement of opinion, but an assertion of historical fact.  The High Court said that the judgment of the Full Court entailed that the reference to ‘binding contract’ conveyed a message about enforceability in an Australian court.  Oh for the inscrutable verdict of a jury!

It is unlikely in the extreme that any investor analysed the statement in the manner that the High Court did.  The ordinary investor – any member of the public – simply does not have the equipment for those intellectual gymnastics.  The ordinary investor would look at the announcement and say that if that is what the company is telling the stock exchange, then we are meant to rely on it.  Now, that reasoning might be circular, but an immaculate conception of logic is not a prerequisite for investing in shares.  People in business would regard the statement as ‘bankable’.

Commercial lawyers looking at this statement would raise their eyebrows.  Whether or not a contract has become binding is a matter that is notorious for its legal difficulty.  Especially in China!  And that is precisely why this statement was so dangerous.  The ordinary investor is not a lawyer trained to see how problematic this kind of legal conclusion or opinion might be.  These kinds of deals worth billions are stitched up at great length by legal teams working around the clock to develop what is called the ‘bible’ which is longer than the Bible.  A partner of one of the international law firms that makes these bibles who saw this reference to a ‘binding contract’ before the bible had come into being may simply have said a Hail Mary for the Professional Indemnity partner of the law firm that signed off on this announcement (and you can bet that a team of lawyers was involved there).

Well, Fortescue spent eight years backpedalling from the word ‘binding’ and the company found itself on safe ground when the music stopped.  On any view of these proceedings, Fortescue showed a reckless indifference to the market in its shares being properly informed, and there can scarcely be one investor in Australia who will be glad that Fortescue got away with it.  And then left you and me to pick up a tab that could have got us a good jet fighter.

11

Controlling the hearing

While a great amount of court time is spent on directions for steps to be taken before the hearing, not much time is spent at the hearing in controlling and expediting the process.  The trouble is that nearly every direction that a court gives before the hearing requires a party to do something, and that means that the lawyers have to work, and that means that the bill keeps going up.  But we rarely see the court giving directions that are designed to reduce the bill.

Most lawyers work on a meter – on an hourly or daily rate.  The more hours or days they spend on a job, the more they get paid.  It is not in their financial interests to do their work so as to reduce as far as possible the time that they spend on the job.  Two or more generations ago, this was done not by paying them for time spent but by paying them a lump sum.  They were not paid to read the brief or to prepare for the hearing – they got a fee for the whole brief to appear.  It was called a brief fee, and if, say, that was enough to cover a couple of days in court, counsel would not be minded to take much longer.  You could rely on them for that.

The courts therefore have an interest in controlling the time that counsel take to conduct the trial.  They have more than an interest in doing so, because their main job is to provide a fair hearing, and they do not do that if they allow the hearing to get of hand so that one or both parties cannot afford to go on.  Indeed, it is sometimes hard to avoid the conclusion that some judges just sit there blandly in the God-given hope that eventually the combatants will run out of steam and surrender – at which point the judge most graciously congratulates them on their wisdom.  And delay usually hurts the weak more than the strong.

It was perhaps inevitable that parliaments would relieve tribunals from being obliged to follow the rules of evidence, because undue technicality could frustrate their doing their jobs, and because not many understand the rules.  But a lot of the law of evidence just applies logic or common sense or basic notions of fairness.  Unless you apply some notion of relevance, you may never finish.  If one side is going to say that a witness for the other side is mistaken or lying on a point, that should be put to that witness while they are in the box so that they can deal with it.  If one party can call a witness about what happened, but does not, they are open to the comment that the inference is that the witness would not help them.  These are all matters of common sense that any tribunal should apply.

And if it has any sense, it should apply the rule that says that if an answer is given to a question that is not related to a fact in issue but merely goes to credit, then that answer is final.  The other party cannot call evidence to contradict it.  Otherwise you are exposed to an infinite regress.  The failure to observe this rule is one reason why cross-examination takes so long.  Another reason is the delusion held by so many at the bar that cross-examination is a no-fly zone for the laws of evidence.  There is a general miasma about this which I think has contributed greatly to the length of hearings.

Not many people now can cross-examine.  Rather, they get together a large pile of documents, which it has cost the parties a fortune to assemble, and let the witness know that he or she is going to be invited on a long and painful journey.  Tabbed court books of documents and computer files have contributed to this deterioration.  So far as I know, it is still the law that if you call on the other side to produce a document, you can be compelled to tender it.  In our paper-crazed condition, that law is barely heard of now or even remembered.

So, one way to control the hearing is by applying rules of logic and sense.  Another way is by fixing time limits.  If we got through, say, half a dozen witnesses between 10 am and 11.45, I could apportion the time remaining until lunch between counsel for their addresses.  They might want to go on after 1 pm, but gastric juices then play their part.  Nor did I hesitate to tell counsel that cross-examination was too long, going nowhere, or just plain unhelpful.  ‘How will this questioning assist this process?’  I do not know how judges can just sit there while cross-examination goes on for hours or days in an apparent attempt to revive trial by ordeal.  If counsel have not scored a real hit in an hour, it is time to intervene.  It is your job to provide a fair and sensible trial: to put people out of pain, not to extend it.

Judges are properly wary of quotes for time given by barristers – especially if their chance of getting a start improves with a low quote.  For your own purposes, you might double the quote.  For their purposes, you might halve it.  I chaired a public inquiry in a very sensitive and much publicised matter.  I had four lay people around me who had full-time jobs and little time to spare.  (One was the late Ron Casey of Channel 7 and World of Sport.)  Senior counsel for both sides gave a considered estimate of four months to start much further down the track.  We told them we would start shortly, and that they could have four days – and we held them to it.  Sometimes you have to put your foot down.  No organ of government has unlimited means, and every organ of government bears some responsibility for dealing with its cost.  The great Lord Mansfield recognised that lawyers are the main cause of delay – together with litigants without merit.

Before leaving the discussion of the hearing, I might mention another issue that may affect the nature and the length of the hearing.  You would think that the questions was he negligent or was he honest would attract the same kind of inquiry as the questions was he in a position of confidence or did he act unconscionably?  But because of our history of common law and equity, that may not be so.

Sarah Jenyns, who was born in 1865, ‘conducted a matriarchal business in corsets and surgical appliances.’  The business was hugely successful and involved her seven children.  In 1946, she transferred the business to a company, but she did not ensure that each child took shares, ‘and thereby [she] planted the seeds to this litigation’.

A subsequent transfer to one son was attacked.  He was said to have been in a position of confidence when she was vulnerable.  The trial in Queensland had to be before a jury and it ran for 28 days.  The evidence revealed that Mrs Jenyns had her foibles – she could have walked straight out of a novel by Patrick White.  She claimed to be in touch with the Almighty; she fell into periods of silence when she would only communicate in paper; and she had developed a taste for rum, whisky, and opiates.  She was a living land-mine for litigation.  As the joint judgment of the High Court (Dixon, CJ, and McTiernan, and Kitto, JJ) said:

There were conflicts of expert and other evidence characteristic of such issues, but doubtless the root cause of this controversy lay in the unusual nature of Mrs. Jenyns’ personality and the complex and inconsistent psychological elements forming it.  In a woman of proved business capacity, and considerable practical experience, possessing a peculiar understanding of her specialized trade and its profitable exercise, never separating her business and family life and always striving to dominate in both, and yet long accustomed to profess that her actions were guided by direct communications from a divine source, lacking all sense of the incongruous in the purposes for which she vouched heaven as her authority, temperamental in many of her attitudes and judgments, uninhibited either by a sense of humour or a fear of ridicule, it must have been difficult as she advanced in age to distinguish in her what was merely temperamental or perhaps histrionic from what was irrational, and difficult to judge whether her less rational expressions and ideas had any bearing on her business instinct and understanding and how far family predilections competed in her judgment with practical considerations affecting her own business advantage.  One curious feature of the case is that at the trial Mrs. Jenyns was still living and might have been called as a witness.

The Queensland Supreme Court set aside the transfer of shares that was attacked.  The High Court allowed the appeal on the merits.  The High Court commented on the obvious difficulty in running a case like this before a jury, and in in the kind of language that we associate with that Court, it said:

The jurisdiction of a court of equity to set aside a gift or other disposition of property as, actually or presumptively, resulting from undue influence, abuse of confidence or other circumstances affecting the conscience of the donee is governed by principles the application of which calls for a precise examination of the particular facts, a scrutiny of the exact relations established between the parties and a consideration of the mental capacities, processes and idiosyncrasies of the donor. Such cases do not depend upon legal categories susceptible of clear definition and giving rise to definite issues of fact readily formulated which, when found, automatically determine the validity of the disposition.

Their honours referred to the remarks of an English equity judge made not long after the Battle of Waterloo: ‘A court of law works its way to short issues, and confines its views to them.  A court of equity takes a more comprehensive view, and looks to every connected circumstance that ought to influence its determination upon the real justice of the case.’

For better or for worse, that difference in the trial process may still be with us every day – even in humble statutory tribunals.  The other worrying thing about this case is that apart from allowing the appeal on the merits, the High Court held that the whole action was outside the powers of the statutory officer who sued, and that the action should have been dismissed on this ground alone.  It looks like the point was not noticed until the parties got to the High Court.  The conversations between the parties and their lawyers might then have become a little strained.

12

The decision

A judge once concluded a judgment saying ‘I hope that I haven’t said anything new’.  That kind of shyness is less in vogue now.  But it might lead you to ask the question.  Will deciding this case require me to say something new?  Unless you are on the High Court, the answer will almost certainly be no.  In that case you can dispose of the matter as crisply as you can, while doing as little damage as possible to the people involved or to the fabric of the law.

But in the rare case where you may have to say something new, why should not those same considerations apply?  If you are going to add to the body of our law, then unless you are some kind of juristic superstar, which you almost certainly are not, the chances are that your efforts will leave us worse off.  Why should not you still seek to get rid of the matter saying as little as decently possible?  Did anything – anything – good at all come out of the gallons of ink spilled by nine judges arguing about whether Twiggy had told a fib?

So, I would suggest that the first thing is to keep the decision as short as the law and evidence permits.

The next and related tip is to start as soon as possible doing them on the spot.  It will depend to some extent on jurisdiction, and on temperament.  The late Bill Crockett told me that he enjoyed the Practice Court – ‘it gives you a chance to chance your arm.’  He was on any view a pre-eminent judge – the most imposing judge I have appeared before – but you need to confront something like that sentiment, and the sooner you do so, the better – otherwise you may never get round to it.  And the most gripping disease that can cripple a judge is getting behind in reserved judgments.  We see it so often, and it is a very sad failure of character and the system.

On disciplinary tribunals, I think that the decision should be given on the spot, and face to face with the punter.  You should do it to their face, but you can reserve the right to add to and vary those reasons later.  You may want to do that on some tribunals because people may look to you for guidance on some issues.

I never felt up to giving a decision on the spot in complex cases like charity cases, preferential securities cases, group pay-roll, or tax evasion cases – for one thing, I had no idea what the endgame might be, and it may not be a good idea to think out loud in those cases.  Nor did I think those cases were ones where I should chance my arm, since there were tricky issues of law or fact.  But where the issue was just one of credit or penalty or whether a contract had been concluded by a certain date, there was no problem about doing it on the spot.  It is not my area of practice, but I wonder why most appeals on sentence are not dealt with on the spot.  Do we really suppose that the science of punishment is that precise?

We tend to forget now that from its creation, the English Court of Appeal tried to get through most of its load on the spot.  Oliver Wendell Holmes loved this idea – he would doubtless have been up for it.  Our High Court used to do it occasionally.  I referred earlier to the rule that if you call for a document, you can be compelled to tender it.  The authority is Walker v Walker.  That was a matrimonial case – presumably of a very wealthy couple since this maintenance case started before Magistrate.  The Court gave its judgment on the spot.  Latham, CJ and Dixon, J offered brief observations.  Here is the judgment of Justice Starke:

I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, but I do not agree that the letter which has been referred to was admissible in evidence of the husband’s means. It is, of course, an old rule that if a party calls for a document in the course of the trial he is bound to put it in if so required, but it does not follow that every statement in such a document, hearsay and otherwise, is evidence. It is for the court to consider the matter in each case, and in this particular case all that happened was that the letter was put in to confirm the wife’s statement that her knowledge of her husband’s means was based on hearsay and nothing else. I should not have thought that the letter could in these circumstances be used affirmatively, or that it had any probative value whatever. However, I think there was other evidence which was given of the husband’s position in life and positions that he had occupied which were sufficient to support the decision of the magistrate.

The parties like judges who are short and to the point.  Instead, we are lost on a sea of cut-and-paste agglutination of the style so deplored by good judges.

On the length and depth, or scholarship, of the judgments, I think that the problem has got worse over the last generation or so with footnotes.  They should have no place in the courts.  The taxpayers fund the judiciary to resolve disputes, not to compile and compound juristic theories and theses.  The actual litigants are much more aware of this distinction than judges think.  They just want to be put out of their misery and not to be used as a source of ammunition for the next bunch of guinea pigs – the problem is that empire building does not just hold up the litigants who are the parties in the exercise, but it helps to make it worse for the next lot.  And who wants to be put down by a footnote?

May I take it to be common ground that we have too much law already?  If so, how confident is any would-be law-maker that their next new law will leave us net better off?  So, to the wunderkind or appeal court who wants to unload the next few hundred page bible, I put the Latin question: cui bono?  Just who is the audience?  Certainly not those who paid for it – the parties.

Two of the tablets of our law of negligence were given by two masters of the law, Justice Cardozo in Macpherson v Buick Co. and Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson.  Elsewhere I said this:

One footnote may be permitted to these judgments.  That of Cardozo J is about ten pages in the reports; that of Atkin is about twenty one pages.  Atkin in his judgment refers to the ‘illuminating judgment’ of Cardozo, and apologises for his own ‘long judgment’.  Heaven only knows what either of these great judges would have thought of the effusive fulminations of the doom-thunderers of nowadays.

The movie Casablanca takes ninety-four minutes.  Any director who makes a film longer than that is at risk of being seen to flirt with Destiny.  So is any judge who takes longer than Justice Cardozo or Lord Atkin.

Finally, if you are going to reserve, get it done quickly.  Don’t let it or others turn into a cancer.  If the case has run for more than a day, you can have the introduction and summary of the evidence and argument made up as you go.  The instincts developed over twenty-five years fighting cases will lead you to review the evidence and the law, and then make findings on the evidence and draw the conclusions of law – and so you come to decide the issues.  It is about a five phase process.

It has been a very long tradition to expose in Anglo-American courts to expose the reasoning in this structured manner.  Nowadays we use that ghastly word ‘transparency’.  This is not the way they do it in Europe.  They think we are odd.  Major law firms now follow the advice that Sir Ernest Gowers (in The Complete Plain Words) gave to the English Civil Service: ‘Begin by answering his question.’  I doubt whether that mode will take on here, because the judiciary is not the civil service, or the retailer of advice to paying customers, but you could well remember how Sir Ernest summarised his rules: ‘Be short, be simple, be human.’  And judges should be encouraged to give a summary of any reserved judgment.

All this has to be done when the case is fresh in your mind – especially if issues of credit are involved.  It is not fair to the parties to allow a lapse of time to flirt with your powers of recall and analysis.  Such a course is unjust.

I have always tried to give a decision on the day of hearing or the next.  I don’t think I ever sat on one for longer than a week.  If anyone wants to say that I confronted less pressure of work than they do, I will be interested to hear from them.  We are talking about professional duty and discipline.  For myself, I cannot understand how any judge at first instance could in good conscience sit on one for more than a month.  You are then likely to cause real pain to real people, and you are not doing the right thing by the rest of us either.  If such a practice were adopted, and it had the effect of reducing attempts to match War and Peace, very few would dress themselves in mourning.

13

Appeals

About thirty years ago, I was at an ABA Conference in New York.  I attended a very affable breakfast for appellate counsel.  Late in the session, I asked if there was an agenda.  ‘Not really, Counsellor.  There is only so much you can say about appellate advocacy, and it has all been said before.  We just fix the agenda for the next meeting.’  That sounded most agreeable.  It was there that I heard for the first time the U S description of appeals’ judges – they hide out in the hills while the real action is going on, and when it is over, they come down and shoot the wounded.  That observation has an American ring to it – a ring of the West.

My own view is that the pain is far less if those doing the shooting are drawn from those who might be shot – and it was a mistake to have a separate Court of Appeal.  The ordinary punter gets nervous with splits in the higher reaches of government.  There is no point in adding to the hierarchy for the sake of it.  It is inevitable that a separate Court of Appeal will develop a sort of aloofness that will lead to estrangement from those still in the trenches.  The more rungs there are on a ladder, the more rickety it becomes, and the easier it is for some to look down on others, and for those others to feel passed over or looked down on.  The principal differences between trial judges and intermediate appeals judges lie in their apparent self-esteem and capacity to make law; the two are related.

The position looks very bad in Victoria with County Court judges all the time being spoken down to by faceless judges who have little part to play with the bar or the profession at large.  This is very unhealthy because the Court of Appeal and the County Court appear to operate on different juristic levels.  There is a kind of intellectual apartheid.  It is worse than the public service in Canberra.

Then comes the coup de grace.  Some of those appeal judges have never fought a criminal case, never fought a case before a jury, and have never directed a jury.  And yet those whose bread and butter has been to appear in front of or to direct juries have to be lectured by some who have never done it.  In the Heydon Royal Commission, the whole nation can see the problems that arise when you ask someone to do the work of a trial judge and they have no training for that purpose.

There is another cause of disaffection.  Our appeal judges have not got their act together in stating their view of the law in crisp simple terms that can be applied by your everyday trial judge.  There are too many judgments with too much said.  We have abandoned the wisdom of our ancestors that held that dissent on high is unhealthy, and on the High Court in particular, we have had to put up with prima donnas whose conception of their own egos has not allowed them to be just one of the team, but requires them to flaunt their own wares – to the benefit of no one except those idle people who have the time to read that kind of stuff.

But you should not be troubled by appeals.  I say that although my sense is that County Court judges are delivering a lot more reserved judgments than they used to because appeals are a lot more prevalent than before.  I have never understood why judges get so scratchy about appeals.  Unless you have said that 1+1=3 or that Donoghue v Stevenson is a leading case on the tort of homicide, the fact that another lawyer comes to a different view to yours appears to me to be an utterly inconsequential result of the fact that litigation is a lottery.  On more than one occasion in tax cases, I have told the punter that a win from me might be their worst result along a winding and rough road.  I also often told counsel that many parts of the law are beyond my comprehension.

I have been talking of the sensitivities of judges.  Far more important are the interests of the parties.  There was an old Latin maxim to the effect that it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation.  Most litigation is hurtful.  Appeals are forms of litigation that extend the hurt.  Some appeal courts compound it by ordering a retrial.  That happens when some judges say that one or others got it wrong, and the parties have to suffer the consequences.

My own view is that we have far too many appeals, and that if the bloke next door found out how many criminal trials had to be repeated, to the unspeakable misery of those involved, he would be outraged – and I do mean outraged.  Even in my jurisdiction, there were bad accidents.  Some brothers named Christian on the land in Gippsland had to turn up before me on a dispute with the revenue authority about stamp duty on a partition of their farming property.  That was a subject on which I was anything but confident.  These farming brothers had not, like Twiggy, sought to bring government down on them, but they were taken by government, for its own purposes, to a single judge of the Supreme Court, from there to the Full Court, and from there to the High Court.  The stamp duty in question was under $9000.  I think that special leave was refused – otherwise I might just have been the first of five layers of appeal – as happened, I think, to two other cases of mine.

You might say that that is Dickensian or Pythonesque.  In truth, it is a mix of madness and cruelty that can ruin lives.  Our appeals procedures badly need reform.

14

Conclusions

You can usually tell shortly after entering a court-room whether a judge is up to it.  If they look at home in the surrounds and appear to be content in themselves, you’re OK; if not, everyone is in trouble.  In the professions, as in most undertakings, you take a certain amount of learning, skill, and experience as a given – the rest then is character, and for the most part, that does not change.  It is the same on the bench.

We would hope that most judges enjoy the job – those that don’t are a pain.  The pay is good.  The benefits are beyond belief.  They are about the only part of government for whom people have some residual trust left.  There are limits on the lifestyle, but cloistered sodality need not give way to secluded insularity.

I preferred the times when the Supreme Court was the Supreme Court, but all judges still had to do their share of crime, divorce, civil juries, the Practice Court, and circuit.  That mix of people in the street and the gutter helped to stave off that frightful aloofness and ineffable superiority that a taste of ermine confers on so many mortals.

The leading judge of his generation, the late Tom Smith, had a more mundane view of judges.  The ordinary person – the punter – is oblivious to so many of the degrees of separation in the hierarchy that so engage the judges themselves.  Smith thought that the average bloke looked on judges as being not far removed from coppers – people who might, unless you were careful, do you some kind of harm.  I have a very healthy respect for the worth of that view.

There have also been sea-changes in the place of the judiciary over the last generation.  The bench used to be the appointed end of a career at the bar, and retirement from the bench meant retirement.  Neither is the case now.  There are very mixed views on the glowing afterlife of judges, but it is hard to see any loss in a large part of the cream of the bar electing not to take judicial orders.  In the result, there has been a great shift in the spread of intellectual life between the bar and the bench.  I have a clear view that at least in commercial law and equity, the bar now has a strong intellectual preponderance over the bench.  Some might say the same for constitutional law.  In any event, I regard this shift as healthy.  It is altogether right and fitting for people who turn 70 to realise that all the judges out there must be younger than them.  This shift helps keep judges earthed.

I go back to where I started.  ‘People are in conflict and need help.  Your job is to help them by resolving the conflict.  To do so, you will have to take authority over them by making decisions that bind them by the force of the law and the power of government.  The sooner you do this, the better – for you and them’.  Get them into the ring as soon as you can.  Your job is to expedite the resolution of the conflict, not to put up roadblocks to prevent a trial.  Focus on the conflict and not on the process.  A gram of evidence is worth a kilo of process or folderol.  There is no point in trying to fit the parties up with a Rolls Royce if all they want or can afford is a Toyota.

You might think I was being deliberately Bolshie if I said that I was in favour of getting rid of court management, pleadings, discovery, interrogatories, witness statements, court books, compulsory mediations, and transcripts – but I have to say that I have done so for thirty years on tribunals – and governments have an affection for tribunals that I find unhealthy, but which real judges have no interest in feeding.  History suggests that if the judges don’t get their act together, people go elsewhere, with or without the government.

The world is imperfect, and we all have to live with that fact.  You hold your office on trust as a servant of the people, and you seek to discharge that trust by resolving as best you can conflict within the people.  The rest, as someone said, belongs to the madness of art – or else it was summed up thousands of years ago for the Egyptian Civil Service:

Be courteous and tactful as well as honest and diligent.

All your doings are publicly known, and must therefore

Be beyond complaint or criticism.  Be absolutely impartial.

Always give a reason for refusing a plea; complainants

Like a kindly hearing even more than a successful

Plea.  Preserve dignity but avoid inspiring fear.

The precedent following those precepts is a letter from a Minister of Finance to a senior civil servant.  ‘Appollonius to Zeno, greeting.  You did well to send the chickpeas to Memphis.  Farewell.’

NOTES

Churchill on experience: Great Contemporaries, Folio Society, 2015, 6.

Maitland on cricket umpires: Pollock, F and Maitland, F W, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, Rev. Ed., Cambridge, 1898, Vol 2, 620-621.

Description of the process before tax tribunal: Gibson, G, Confessions of a Barrister, Amazon, 2014, Part XII.

High Court judges as junior counsel in Victorian tax cases: Christian v Comptroller of Stamos (1989) 89 ATC 2025; 3 VAR 12; 20 ATR 1206; [1991] 2 VR 129 (Nettle, J); Australian Conservation Foundation v CSR [2002] VCAT 1491 (Gordon, J).  Central Bayside v CSR [2003] VSC was on appeal to Nettle, J, and went to the High Court ((2006) 80 ALJR 1509) where M Gordon QC appeared as amicus.

Kant on thinking methodically: Kuehn, M, Kant, A Biography, C U P, 2001, 235.

The VCAT case and the script for the Sicilian: Confessions, above. Part 12

Fortescue litigation: 264 ALR 201; 190 FCR 364; [2012] HCA 39.

Law of Evidence: being compelled to tender a document you have called for: Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630.

Jenyns litigation: Jenyns v Public Curator (1953) 90 CLR 113 at 118,119.

Judge not wanting to say anything new: Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 at the end of the speech of Lord Steyn.

Macpherson v Buick Manufacturing Co (1916) 217 NY 582; Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; citation from Gibson, G, The Common Law, A History, Australian Scholarly, 2013, 65-66.

Gowers: The Complete Plain Words, Revd. Ed, London, 1973, 13 and 18.

Egyptian Civil Service: Gowers, above, 20.

Passing Bull 25 – Extremism in America

 

The Americans are currently wrestling with two very rubbery words, extremism and terrorism. Each apparently is a word that means what you want it to mean, and nothing else.

For reasons I can understand, some people are tired of hearing Muslems dismiss violent Moslems as extremists. How far off centre do you have to go before you qualify as an extremist? And what happens to you if you qualify?

For reasons I can also understand, people are tired of hearing Muslems say that the extremists are bad, but… Then follows some excusing or softening factor. The extremists are bad, but they have in part become bad because other people were bad to them – or us.

The American Republicans are now going through the same process with one of their number. Donald Trump might fairly be described as an extremist, not to mention the best friend that IS has ever had.  Other Republicans say that, yes, Trump is an extremist, but – a lot of people have been driven to extremes by the weakness of President Obama. It is not pretty to watch.

What is even less pretty is the confusion over terrorism. Mass shootings occur on an almost daily basis in the U S. More than 80 people are shot and killed every day there.  The nation is used to it, even though people still claim to be shocked when each fresh incident arises. The FBI waited for some time before declaring the most recent mass shooting in California was an act of terrorism.

What distinguishes this mass shooting from the others that happen so regularly? These mass killers had some kind of religious training and motivation, and they had been ‘radicalised’, which apparently puts them beyond extremists.

To qualify as a terrorist, you need to be putting people in fear by killing people or by threatening to kill them, but for some ultimate political or religious end. While the presence of politics or religion might indicate that the source of the evil may be more widespread, it is hard to see any basis for moral discrimination between the perpetrators of the various kinds of mass shooting and killing.

It is impossible to see any such discrimination in the US. There people are constitutionally encouraged to bear arms, and that is interpreted to mean that they can buy and have and be able to use any kind of firearm they want to have. People are solemnly told, and by the highest judges in the land, that this is a constitutional right of US citizens.  Why do they have this right?  It is given to them so that they can protect themselves from tyranny.

It is hard to recall a more noxious form of bullshit. What people are being told is that they should be able to remain armed in case they think that the government is becoming oppressive. In that case, they can use their guns to change the government. One of the difficulties is that no one will ever be able to judge when that right may arise. Because when he does claim to exercise the right, not just to bear arms but to use them, the person using the gun will be, by definition, a terrorist – they will be killing or threatening to kill for a political purpose.

Terrorists either win or lose. If they win, they get into power.  If they lose, they get killed.  Nelson Mandela was in the first category; John Wilkes Booth, the second.  In truth, the best example of someone exercising the right to bear arms to remove a tyrant was the man called John Wilkes Booth. He assassinated Abraham Lincoln. He did so expressly on the basis that Lincoln was a terrorist.  Booth is the quintessential American terrorist or extremist.

Now, there are arguments about this – that prevail by a majority of one in the Supreme Court.  A right to bear arms does not entail a right to use them.  This kind of silliness is not what the authors of this clause had in mind in England in 1689 – where the use of handguns in London had long been illegal – but a sensible historical meaning does suit the Court.  And Americans have been let down by their legislators as well as their judges.  Most of them want to stop this killing, but they are too scared to do so.  That is not terrorism, or extremism.  That is just cowardice.  They are victims of people using fear to achieve political ends.  So are all Americans.

So, become a U S citizen, and you too can be a terrorist.  The whole bloody joint is crawling with extremists and terrorists.

Poet of the month: Robert Burns

I have always wondered what the fuss was about Burns. That wonderment has not ceased on my reading of his treatment of the downstairs staff. But here is a poem for the Sisters. I can guarantee that the next one will not be so well received.

How cruel are the parents

How cruel are the Parents

Who riches only prize,

And to the wealthy booby

Poor Woman sacrifice:

Meanwhile the hapless Daughter

Has the choice of strife;

To shun a tyrant Father’s hate

Become a wretched Wife.

The ravening hawk pursuing,

The trembling day thus flies,

To shun the impending ruin

While her pinion tries

Till of escape despairing

No shelter or retreat

She trusts the ruthless Falconer

And drops beneath his feet.